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FOREWORD

This is on® of a series of reports resulting from
the military timber products studies mad® by the Forest
Service for the Corps of Engineers. It is an analysis of

problems that arose to delay or otherwise oodify the orderly
flow of timber products froa the woods to the military
supplier or consumer. Other reportm to follow include;
{1} An analysis of the total volume of timber products re
quested through the Central Procuring Agency, Corps of
Inginners, by all war agencies during the war years, and
(2) a final detailed report of estimated total consumption
of all timber products for military purposes during World
War II.

The timber products studies are financed by the
Corps of Engineers,

M M
5

r4

»*f V\

t*S to

s?

8

h£»
wv

#•4 f\
w% tn

5>
t!>•

o
m

ft,

#
*

«

g
>i s»

$ *>

8

* si

• i

l

l

t*

6

M

g

S?
r>

1

s

Hf

l

'

44

I *. g ^ % n "s

# *»
a

S§
«l

M

c
o
a

I

1. -I -j i 11
* 1
3 I I s .S « .
1
fc.
, fi 5
5 « & I 8 I 8
1
l l is S l l I l I
'

#•4
O

©

tt

2

3S

3

I

3 S

o

U:1

•

*«4 HI H *»4
O JO A A A

a

Hf

42k

«
§5

§
OA

it<x

H
*~4

£
•3

K».w

1i

I
*

s«

is
fat'
fP K
»•
lfl
fe. ,5,
>« (L s o v;w£
£3
SS
8
oO

x

I
8
f**

I
M
<*1

15
©

M

si s § s

§

fci
*

B

» >-?
>
H
*4 f"t

w
A»

•»

>*

CHAPTER I

IITROBUCTIGff
I. PUBPOSE
The purpose of this report is to identify the prob
lems which were obstacles to satisfactory timber products
procurement during the World War II emergency, and to
determine why these problems arose.

A knowledge of the

causes and results of these problems should be helpful in
planning prooureaent and production changes to minimize
these difficulties in the future.
II. SCOPE
This report deals- with the problems that arose in
obtaining timber products for Military and related uses dur
ing 1941-45. la the first part of this period procurement
was decentralized; whereas, later, the Central Procuring
Agency was charged with the responsibility of procuring tim
ber products*

The agencies and their contractors, covered

by this report, are the following:

Army {including Air-

force), Mary, Maritime Commission, Defense Plant Corporation,
War Shipping Administration, Lend Lease.
The satisfaction of requirements of timber products
needed for war must be viewed in the dual light of both
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production and procurement. It is a production problem that
adequate and satisfactory amounts of all needed timber com
modities are manufactured at the right time for needed uses.
In this category are the problems of adequate forest resourc
es, sufficient plant capacity, and manpower, and equipment
requirements.

On the procurement side are the problems of

organisation and personnel as well as administrative dif
ficulties, procurement procedure, and problems of improper
specifications. In short, procurement problems deal with the
difficulties of dividing among the essential uses a given
amount of timber products. Production problems are those
encountered in creating that "given amount of timber prod
ucts."
It is apparent that where production problems are at
the heart of a procurement difficulty, the smoothest func
tioning procurement organization could do little to allevi
ate the situation.

Nevertheless, there were many instances

during the last emergency when the principal difficulty in
obtaining certain timber products was due to procurement
problems and not production factors. However, since the
problems of procurement were often the result of difficulties
in other fields of supply, this report includes an analysis
of the entire field in order to present the procurement fac
tors in their proper setting.

3
III.

THB TIMBER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY

Warfare has developed into a contest of resources and
mechanical ingenuity. Wood is one of those resources and
the art and technique of converting forest trees Into use
able, wood commodities requires technical skills and equip
ment that are just as important to a war effort as the
production of food, munitions, or clothing. Hearly all use#
for wood, either newly developed or old, sooner or later are
pressed into service in waging a war. In order to understand
the problems of production and procurement of these timber
products, the nature of the industry must be understood.
Because of the complexity of the timber products in
dustry due to the wide diversity of products, the geographi
cal distribution of the timber resource, the great variety
of tree species, each having diverse mechanical and physical
properties as well as the many different grades of lumber
within each species, the multitude of independent producers,
and the intricate pattern of distribution to consumers, it
is no wonder that problems arose when it became necessary to
shift the bulk of the industry*s output into channels for
military use.
At the start of mobilization for defense In 1941, the
nation was in a peculiarly favorable situation for the
developments that were t© follow*

A long period of depressed
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construction had built up a full supply of lumber stocks
amounting to approximately eighteen billion board feet,
Also, the grade pattern within these inventories was aloost
perfectly complete. It was only this fortunately large buf
fering supply of stocks that enabled the quick delivery of
construction materials to expanding military installations
and war contractors. By 1945, total lumber stocks were re
duced to four and one half billion board feet and these con
sisted essentially of pipe-line stocks and a broken assort
ment of sizes and grades.
Sawmill capacity within the industry has traditional
ly been in excess of needs. In fact, excess capacity has
been a source of instability and economic weakness in the
industry. In 1947 there was a total of 53,109 active and
£,442 idle sawmills.

This contracts with about 39,000 active

mills in 1942. The increase was due largely to the favorable
price of lumber. However, some production bottlenecks devel
oped during the war in facilities other than sawmills. Lack
of dry kilns slowed lumber production for a time. Treating
plant facilities as well as shortages of preservatives slowed
the treatment of railroad ties, transmission poles, and pil
ing. Production of veneer and plywood has never been able
to keep pace with demands. In 1949, the softwood plywood
industry was comprised of 5? plants on the west coast, whi^e
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hardwood plywood and veneer is produced in the East in nearly
500 plants.
The pattern of sawmill production Is an important con*
sideration of the lumber industry. About ninety-one percent
of the active mills are located in the East, but the nine
percent of the aills situated in the West produce nearly half
•of the nation1 s lumber. The contrast of production by aill
size is also remarkable.

A quarter of the total production

in 1947 was sawed in but 165 of the largest mills. Half of
the total production was produced in but 3.5 percent of all
the mills.

At the other extreme, 15,000 of the smallest

mills produced but a negligible aroount of lumber. Mill size
and numbers are important in production controls. The ex
treme concentrations, both productively and geographically,
in the Pacific lorthwest is misleading, however, because
that production is all of softwood species, while the hard
wood lumber produced in the widely scattered and numerous
eastern mills is a vital war material.
Lumber is the foremost product in volume cut from our
forests.

About seventy percent of the sawtiatber used is con

sumed as lumber. The veneer and plywood industry, although
closely integrated with the lumber industry through & common
source of raw material, is otherwise quite distinct. With
out reflecting relative importance* log consunption in the
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veneer and plywood industry in recent years has totaled only
about five percent of the log consumption for lumber, but the
quality of loga used for veneer and plywood is much higher
than those required for lumber,, The practical operating
capacity of these two industries is set by a combination of
(1) supplies of suitable timber, (2} plant capacity, (3) availability of manpower for logging and manufacturing opera
tions, and (4) available supplies of logging and manufactur
ing equipment, repair parts, etc. Output of logs is the
basic determinant of the capacity of both Industries.
Lumber production has never reached the peak it achiev
ed just after the turn of the century.

Mills then were oper

ating in virgin timber and demands for housing and other uses
in settling the West enabled a production of forty-four bil
lion board feet. During the depression 193Gf s production
was in the twenty billions of board feet. In 1941 and 1942
lumber output rose to thirty-six billion feet for each year,
but production difficulties in the war economy reduced the
production to twenty-eight billion feet in 1945.
The total production of veneer, including that market
ed as plywood, has approximately doubled since 1935®

la

194? the all-veneer production totaled 13.4 billion square
feet.

The growth of the softwood plywood industry accounted

for much of this increase, having quadrupled its output in
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this period to reach a production of two billion square feet
(3/3-inch equivalent basis) in 1949-

The proportion of soft

wood and hardwood veneer in terms of log consumption are now.
approximately equal,
Railroad ties are a vital necessity for trail trans
portation which is so imperative in wartime.

No satisfactory

substitute has been found to displace wood in this use, al
though preservative treatment has lengthened the service-life
of ties from a life expectancy of five to six years when
untreated to fifteen to thirty years when treated.

This

materially conserves on requirements by reducing the replace-

meats needed.
It takes about three thousand ties to lay a mile of
main line track. Oak, the predominant species used, account
ed for about a third of the total production in 1949.

Next

in order were southern piae fourteen percent, gum thirteen
percent, Douglas fir nine percent, and thirty-one percent ia
other species. Perhaps eighty to ninety percent of total
production of cross ties is iadicated in the figures of in
stalled ties of United States railroads. Replacements and
new installations during the 1935-49 period averaged about
forty-nine million ties annually. That figure was swelled to
fifty-seven million in 1942 by the war emergency, but steadi
ly dropped thereafter to only thirty-six million in 1949.

Production of sawed ties and lumber are alternative operations

g
and tie production in a given mill often varies widely over
time, depending upon relative price and Market demands be
tween ties and lumber.
A large amount of wood volume is taken fro® our for
ests and used without much change in form. Some of these
commodities are directly important to a war effort. For ex
ample, the piling used for wharfs, and the utility poles used
at eaaps, posts, and stations.

Other round or split wood

commodities have various degrees of importance and are usual
ly indirectly connected with military operations.
of these are:

Examples

nine timbers, the importance of which is ob

vious; posts, for fara fencing which is a part of food produc
tion; arid fuel wood. Wood for fuel is second only to lumber
in the commodity drain from our forests. However, its use
as a substitute for other combustibles during both World Wars
was never fully exploited.
Most poles and piling are handled by concentration
yards where the output froo a rather wide territory is
typically concentrated. These yards are mainly permanent
establishments with seasoning facilities, pole handling ma
chinery, and equipment for treating with wood preservatives.
In these concentration yards, pole shaving machines are used
for removing bark and smoothing pole surfaces, and the poles
are roofed, gained, bored, and incised prior to treatment
with preservatives.

Preservative equipment used for treating
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these products ranges from simple dipping tanks for butt
treatment to full-length, complex, pressurised cylinders.
About ninety-five percent of all utility poles used are
treated with preservatives, while but sixty percent of the
piling consumption is treated, explainable by the use of
considerable quantities of untreated hardwood piles.
Pole production during the 1935-49 period varied from
about two million pieces in 1943 to nine Billion poles in
1947. Southern pine usually accounts for three-fourths of
the pole production, with western red cedar and Douglas-fir
equally divided to make up a sixth, and the balance of other
species. Piling averages only about fourteen percent of
pole production, which varied fro® 12.7 million linear feet
in 1935 to a wartime peak of 42.2 Million linear feet in
1942.

Like poles, three-fourths of the piling used is south-

era pine, followed by a fifth of Bouglas-fir, and the rest
of other species.
Several miscellaneous timber products industries are
insignificant in terms of wood-volume output, but they rose
to dramatic bottlenecks during the war effort. The problems
they caused will be treated later, but they are mentioned
here to complete the survey of the timber products industry#
Among these miscellaneous timber products industries are th#
cooperage industry, the wood turnery industry, shoe lasts
and related products nsaaufacture, the excelsior industry.
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and commodities mad© of corfc.
To produce adequate timber products is but part of the
task of satisfying demands for these commodities.

Across

the complex pattern of production must be laid the equally

diversified web of consumption with its myriad spread of
specifications and species demands pirns the equally important

time element of delivery. Furthermore, the producing sawRills and plywood mills* as well as the other timber products

plants, are located where the trees grow and this does not
usually coincide with the heavily populated consuming centers®
The marketing machinery for lumber is the most elaborately

developed, while other timber products usually follow a more
direct route to the consumer. In any case, the existing
marketing machinery cannot be circumvented by wartime distri
bution methods without serious hardship to the industry
either during the emergency or is reconversion later to
peacetime activity.
Wholesale lumber dealers say be roughly grouped into
two classes, the "yard" wholesalers and the "office" whole
salers, the terras being practically self-explanatory. Tard
wholesalers are divided into those operating concentration
yards and those who operate distribution yards. There are
about 450 concentration yards, located chiefly in the South,
where they centralize the output of numerous small sawmills.
They way sort* grade» season, surface, and remanufacture the
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raw lumber they receive to enable the® to ship seasoned lum
ber ia carload lots by species, size and grade as desired.
Small sawmills are not capable of performing this function.
Wholesale distributing yards are generally located in some
center of lumber consumption.

The distributing yard buys

carload lots of seasoned* well-manufactured stock from manu; ,

fscturers of recognized standing, puts the lumber in stock
and then sells it to his trade in industry or to retail out

lets.
The office wholesaler operates no yard at all.

He

facilitates shipment direct from producer to buyer, and is
generally situated in the consuming territory.

A large-scale,

office wholesaler may have staffs of salesmen and buyers and
a traffic department to expedite shipments,

ie earns his

usual profit in selling at a margin above costs, but may
finance sawmills, a practice which is quite common.

Commis

sion salesmen perform services halfway between the wholesaler
and a salaried sales force of the producer.

By this means

the sawmill operator can maintain customer contact by direct
invoicing, thus keeping the identity of the mill before the
customer.

The commission man is usually recognized as the

representative of the manufacturer and may represent two or
more producers of the same or different species.

There are

nearly six thousand lumber wholesale distributors and com
mission men.

CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS OF Til PRODUCER OR SUPPLIES
PRODUCTION PROBLEMS
Early in the defense program the War Production Board
and the industry alike shared the impression that lumber
would continue to be available ia any needed amount for any
war purpose, and that it could serve as a substitute for the
more critical metals.

Misinformed confidence in abundance

even permitted civilian wood-using industries to expand.
fhis surface cala was broken ia 1942 when the transition from
surplus to scarcity erupted with alarming seriousness.

A

little later, as the military position changed, the great
demand for construction lumber gave way to an almost insati
able appetite for shipping lumber with which to supply the
offensives under way on world-wide war fronts.
The shortage in volume of lumber and other timber
products somewhat obscured certain quality shortages that
occurred early in the emergency and in many cases existed all
through the w%r and were never truly eliminated.

Examples

of this type of shortage were aircraft-quality Douglas-fir
and spruce lumber, birch and mahogany veneer for plane con
struction, oak for ship building, and many specialty items
of exacting quality demands.
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Over all>of the production problems hang a general
lack of appreciation of the problems of the industry by
those outside it and an equal lack of appreciation of war
demands for timber products within the industry.

This sec

tion of the report alas to outline the major problems of
production encountered during the last emergency.

They in

dicate the need for a high order of production planning as
a wise course for future wood-for-war production.
TIE PROBLEM Of FOREST RESOURCES
Production of timber products requires forest re
sources.

Authorities**- judged the forest resource situation

was serious in this country before the war, and certainly
the accelerated drain during the emergency in no way better
ed the situation. To many ^victory" in World War II is takes
us synonoaous with "sufficiency."

That the war effort goal

was reached seems to obscure the difficulties of obtaining
the necessary timber products, shades the fact that better
timber and more desirable species could have added greater
efficiency to the struggle, and generally blanket as unim
portant the depletion of our forest resources.

National Plan for American Forestry, Senate Docu
ment #12, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, 1933, and the Report of
the Joint Committee on Forestry, Senate Document #32, 77th
Congress, 1st Session, 1941*
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For the country as a whole the problem of inadequate
stumpage for construction lumber was not high on the list of
factors affecting production. There ware localities where
mills were forced to cease operation, but there were a great
«any more places where logs became difficult to get and those
that were obtained, in most cases, were of inferior quality.
Satisfactory Douglas-fir peeler logs were especially in short
supply. The war-time drain of thesa high-quality logs around
Paget Sound was not to b# fully appreciated until after the
conflict.

Currently, some plywood mills in that area are be

ing forced to seek their log supply elsewhere.
Presently inaccessible timber deters production just
as effectively as the lack of forest resources. In certain
sections of the country, especially the mountainous area of
the west, there are considerable quantities of desirable
timber that have remained unavailable, largely because of the
excessive cost of logging it. The major cost in such opera
tions is the expense of road construction into these difficult-to-reach areas. In June, 1942, Congress passed the
Access loads Act which provided funds which could be used
for improving existing roads or the construction of new roads
to tap additional timber resources urgently needed in the
war. Five months later, twenty-six projects were approved
totaling 354 miles for an estimated expenditure of about 1.3
billion dollars*

These projects opened up 10.^ billion board
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feet of standing timber. It was reported that this material
ly aided production. The program is commendable in bringing
a larger forest area into commercial production and manage
ment, relieving some pressure on the more accessible and
over-cut areas, and provided immediate results in increased
production of quality raw materials from virgin stands. The
Forest Service is asking Congress for five million dollars
to build access roads in the next budget period.
Quality hardwood stumpage and certain softwood species
and grades were important resource problems during th® emer
gency. the big problem and bottleneck in the production of
amay wood specialty items was the lack of suitable raw mater*
i&ls. For use in a number of these items, the species and
quality specified cannot be readily substituted.

The fact

that this type of production problem arose early in the war
and most of them either remained unsolved or were alleviated
with much difficulty leads to the conclusion that this re
source deficiency deserves careful consideration.

An import

ant aspect of the problem is the length of time it takes to
grow timber.

The wood uses in which inadequate and unsatis

factory forest resources posed a problem are listed below:
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LIST OF CEITIClLLf SHORT TIMBER PRODUCTS IM WORLD WAR II*
Mm

Remarks

Hickory Specialty Items
Ski blanks, handle
blanks, picker sticks,
shunt poles, ladder
rungs

Timber is scattered; before war
most of logs were hauled to
mills by farmers# Shortage of
far® labor and low ceiling prle*
es on hickory logs adversely
affected production of logs
which was bottleneck in produc
ing these items. Picker sticks
for textile industry and shunt
poles for railroad industry were
taken in large volume by England
on Lend Lease*

Ash Specialty Iteas
Lifting tool handles
Boat oars

Ash timber suitable for these
uses getting -scarce. Problem
same as hickory.

Whits Oak
Ship timbers
Truck body material

Oak timber suitable for ship
timbers not available in large
quantities. Used laminated
timbers during war to supple
ment supply. Truck body lumber
specifications were rigid and
requirements higher than supply.
Finally modified specifica
tions.

kalnut
Qua stock blanks

*rees are scattered. Difficul
ty in meeting requirements due
to specialised industry, large
requirements and scattered
timber.

Iallow Poplar
Aircraft veneer
Aircraft lumber

Supply timber suitable to pro
duce clear long lengths is
limited.

Dogwood and Persiiamon

Timber is scattered and was
usually supplied by farm labor
before war and problea was same
as for hickory. Lend Lease
took large quantities to British
textile industry.

•From a letter in the files of the Corps of Engineers.
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Port Orford Cedar
Battery separators
Boat planking

Supply of timber diminishing
rapidly* Is only wood suitable
for certain technical battery
separators of which large
quantities were required by
England for direct military
purposes. Other woods could be
used for boat planking and much
of the boat planking was pro
duced from logs that would not
make battery separators.

All of these items were in tight
Imported Woods
supply and requirements had to
Mahogany for planes and
be adjusted downward to meet
boats
supply.
Teak for ship decking
Balsa, for flotation
equipment
Raw cork for insulation
and gaskets
Lignum Vitae for underwater
bearings
Maple
Shoe lasts
Die blocks
Veneer logs
Chestnut
Tanin extract

All chestnut has been killed by
blight and remaining standing
dead chestnut trees getting
scarce.

Locust
Insulator pins

Requirements were high for a
while and price of locust cord-*
wood was out of line with pulpwood prices which discouraged
production. Timber is scattered
but supply is ample.

Clearheart Red Cypress

Supply limited. Especially
timber to produce a clear wide
and long lengths.

Southern Pine
Vertical grain ship
decking

id
Douglas Fir
Ponton chess
Ship decking
12s* to 16* widths
Ship plank
12» widths
WC" & Btr Clear
12" aad wider
Wood Stave Tank and Pipe Stock
Ponderosa Pine
BC" Select and Btr.
All sizes
Sugar Piae
nCn 3elect and Btr,
Pattern Stock
All sises
Port Orford Cedar
Alaskan Yellow Cedar
Boat Stock
All sizes
Western Red Cedar
Poles
Class 3 & larger, 45' and longer
Preservative treated lumber, Insufficient treating capacity*
Piles, poles, all
to meet demand during World
species
War II. Capacity has not been
materially increased.
Kilo Dried lumber
All species

n

n

n

THE PROBLEM OF MANPOWER SHORTAGE
Luaber production was affected early in the war by
manpower shortages and the problem remained critical until
after V-J Day. For at least the latter half of this period
the manpower shortage was by far the most serious immediate
problem facing the industry.
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The shortage was due both to a lack of workers and to
the lowered effectiveness of those remaining in the industry.
The problem was universal in that all types of aills and all
sections of the country were affected. Although manpower
shortages were experienced in virtually every industry there
is good reason to believe that the lumber industry was par
ticularly at a disadvantage in coping with the manpower
problems.

The reasons for this are partly inherent in the

lumber industry and partly the result of the war-time complex
©f industrial, military and agricultural activities in which
lumber production was rather unsuccessfully competing for a
position of comparable essentiality.

There were three major

causes of the manpower probl^j they are: (1) Migration from
lumber to other industries, {2} Military enlistments and
Selective Service inductions, and (3) Absenteeism and turn
over.
Selective Service losses, especially toward the last,
were extremely serious. The industry was at a particular
disadvantage in the following respects. In the woods, even
wore than in the aills, young, able-bodied men occupied a
large number of positions which could not adequately be
filled by older workers.
and dangerous as logging.

Few other industries are as arduous
This fact explains an important

part of the woods labor problem when it is considered that
the draft removed virtually all full-tin© woods®®** under the
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age ©f twenty-six and a large proportion of all full-time
workers under thirty. The impact of the draft ©a the lumber
Industry, particularly the woods industry, was increased by
the fact that lumbering is predominantly a rural industry,,
competing in war-time with agriculture for its labor. Rural
draft boards, acting under the Tydings amendment, gave a
large share of their deferments to young farmers aad had to
make up the difference by drafting woodsmen, When farmers
were drafted, lumber production was often affected since it
is comraon practice for farmers to engage in a sideline of
logging and lumbering la slack seasons. One of the »ost
serious aspects of this general problem involved the reaoval
of key workers, especially small operators whose loss usual
ly threw from two to twenty more employees out of lumber
production.
Migration of a very large number of lumber company
employees was of extreme importance in curtailing output.
The reasons for migration lies in the actual and imagined
disadvantages in the life of a lumberman, coupled with the
real and imagined advantages of a »war plant" job.

Recruit

ment activities of Federal Agencies and war plan agents wert
persistent and widespread. The lowliest workers in the most
remote places were repeatedly sought with offers of almost
fabulous pay, paid transportation, and negligible expenses.
Important inducementa were the legends (often substantiated)
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of easy work and featherbedding, unlimited overtime and
other advantages,
Absenteeism and turnover among lumber workers was a
very serious problem*

These factors are traditional in both

woods and mills, but during the war, losses mounted out of
all reason in wany cases*

Some claimed that absenteeism

jumped when wages went up, others looked to increased wages
as a solution to the difficulty. However, the average lumber
worker in the average camp or aill town seemed t© be more
demoralised than spurred on to more work by a big pay check*

In any event, pay rates are a key factor affecting produc
tion and are involved in union activity and government pol
icy, aside from affecting the bargaining position of the
industry.
In summarizing, it might be said that the particular
and rather peculiar requirements of the industry were not
understood, nor were preventative steps correctly aligned
with the problem, with the result that adequate and realistic
aid was not extended by agencies controlling manpower fac
tors.
In the first place, a large segment of the lumber
industry is primarily a small-unit industry more comparable
to farming in many respects than to industrial organisation*
Only a few operators can reasonably be expected to respond
to, or utilise, the type of coatrals and facilities set up
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for ordinary units*

Their lack of powerful political or in

dustrial representation was a great disadvantage.
The War Manpower Commission, with the United States
Employment Service, exercised great authority through its
control of labor, hut it is not apparent that any activity
of this agency was to the positive widespread advantage of
lumber production*

Labor stabilisation orders were gener

ally a one-way road permitting loss of workers from lumber
mills to higher paid, easier occupations. Ineffective con
trols permitted theai to leave an occupation which had no
counterbalancing inflow of satisfactory labor*

The only

counterbalancing effect was the use of abnormal sources of
labor such as women, children, cripples, prisoners of war,
and foreigners.

The numbers of workmen in the industry

toward the end of the war were bo indication of the actual
labor shortage. The creaia of the labor had been gone for
months and years. Woods work is young men*s work, but the
average age of lumberjacks in at least one Upper Peninsula
Michigan camp was over fifty years.
The isolated and individualized nature of much of the
lumber industry aade it difficult for manpower controls to
be exercised.

Many of the men felt that no war-time control

could reach them for some special reason. Men who were mil
itarily eligible but in deferred classifications were quite
likely to be mmmplmry workers. If such a man became over
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age or otherwise unfit for military service, he very oftea
abandoned consistent production in favor of absenteeism,
job-hunting, non-essential occupation, aad similar activi
ties,, The poor eoapetitive position of the jobs available
also contributed to the general lack of servicing of the
Industry by war agencies whose stated function was to sup
ply manpower and keep it on the job. Ironically, the War
Department for many months forbad® the us® of prisoners of
war in logging and lumbering, erroneously holding that it
was in violation of the Geneva Convention*

After it was dis

covered that actually such use was advocated by the Conven
tion, lumber operators found almost every conceivable impedi
ment in the way of obtaining prisoners of war for their
labor needs. Labor unions did not welcome the idea of using
prisoner of war labor and this view was shared by some labor
conciliators.
THE PROBLEM OF EQUIPMENT SIOSTAOES
Shortages of certain items of heavy equipment together
with the necessary tires, replacement parts, and operating
naterials had a direct bearing on the amounts of timber prod
ucts produced during the emergency.

Among the items needed

by the industry which hindered production the most were
crawler tractors, wheel type tractors, trucks, lift and
lumber carriers, stationary power units, ®otor graders,
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cranes and shovels and miscellaneous Items of dirt moving
equipment needed for the construction of logging roads.
fires, replacement parts, gasoline, and permanent type anti
freeze were among the subsidiary needs that became problems.
Shortage of these items of equipment were second only
to shortage of labor in affecting the production of timber
products. In fact, shortage of labor tended to augment the
demand and need for equipment, since aost operators, in the
face of dwindling labor supplies, were forced to mechanize
their operations to offset lack of asanpower, thereby greatly
increasing the demand for scarce items of heavy equipment.
Approximately eighty percent of the total volume of
sawlogs is carried by trucks all or part way from the woods
to the sawmills. In 1941 an estimated 36,000 truck units
were in either full or part-time use in logging and lumber
production, or an estimated full-time equivalent of 52,000
trucks and 25,000 trailers.
Annual replacement needs were estimated to be 11,666
trucks.

Heavy duty trucks and other heavy duty equipment

competed directly with military requirements. For example,
lift trucks and lumber carriers, machines developed original
ly by and for the lumber industry, were in great demand by
the Army and Navy for use at docks and on construction pro
jects for use in handling construction materials. Similarly,
they war# seeded around sawmills to handle lumber and, since
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one machine could accomplish the work of about twenty m&n
handling lumber by hand, the demand for them was tremendous
and neyer could be fully met.

The trend of iacreased demand

for labor saving equipment t© expand production is also ex
emplified in tractors, During the five year period immediate
ly preceding the war, the average yearly demand for tractors
in the lumber industry was 1,$00 units*

there was a steady

increase during the war years until ia 1945 the need, based
upon closely screened applications, was for 4,000 units of
&11 size classes,
fire controls posed some difficult problems.

For

example, prior to the war the losing industry had been using
a special type tire, particularly in the Pacific lorthwest,
where the loads were heavy due to the large size of the logs*
To reduce the load and weight., enabling the use of smaller

tires, slows production and adds, to logging cost, yet as soon
us the war started these special tires were practically elim
inated from civilian consumption*

The industry was forced

to use inferior tires with shorter life in the face of a
shortage of tires for replacement purposes.

There were

Instances when the military agencies actually suffered fro®
lack of lumber because the lumber industry lacked tire# that
the military had taken.
Local shortages in gasoline supplies occurred, but
seldom interfered with direct productive processes. Some
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lumber wholesalers, log buyers, graders, and other specialists
ia the industry were hindered in travel by automobile.

Ethyl

ene glycol base anti-freeze, being a diversion of explosive
manufacture, naturally same into tight war-time supply.

Lack

of foresight and planning for anti-freeze needs for the timber
industry unnecessarily delayed and curtailed production8
Certain Miscellaneous equipment and supplies commonly
utilized by logging, sawmill, and other wood working indus
tries, because of their scarcity in civilian supply developed
into inconveniences affecting production* The principal
items werej

aianila ropet work gloves, work shoes and boots,

wool underwear, work clothing, and sawbits. They, at no
time, were a serious deterrent to total production, but were
acute handicaps in some areas due to unbalanced distribution.
Inequities in food rationing were of a more serious
nature, Logging requires extreme physical exertion and
necessitates the highest food calorie intake of any of the
heavy industrieso

Allotted the same rations as tea-rooms and

drug stores, logging camps quickly ran out of meats, fats,
sugar, coffee, and processed foods*

Their isolated location

prohibited effective supplementation with fresh vegetables
and some other non-rationed foods.

After considerable delay

and hindered production, differential rationing by the Office
of Price Administration at least partially corrected the
situation*
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Til PROBLEM OP ADVERSE AMD UNSEASONABLE WEATHER
The very nature of the timber products Industry makes
It vulnerable to weather conditions. The normal operating
procedure is cyclic in the industry in order to adjust pro
duction to seasonal fluctuation in the weather. For example,
in parts of the Lake States, swamps and bogs prohibit much
woods activity until they freeze over during the winter, thus
delays in freezing, intermittent thaws., and early springs can
cause serious production handicaps there.

On the other hand,

unusual cold spells can freeze log ponds at mills and stop or
materially delay production.

Normal snows may be useful in

packing and sraoothing roads as well as enabling sled logging,
but deep or wind-drifted snows may stall log transportation.
The usual rains are always taken into account, however, heavy
or unseasonable rains can cause great production handicaps
ranging from muddy, impassable roads and washed out culverts,
and bridges to flooded bottomlands, mill settings, and lost
log booms.

Even high winds cause delays in blowing down

numerous trees that block logging roads. Storms also cause
difficult salvage jobs by causing jackstraw arrangements of
interlocked stems in blow-down area3.
The importance of weather handicaps varies in differ
ent regions of the country, but everywhere weather must be
considered as a production factor. l*og production is the
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fflost vulnerable to weather, Belays in log production com
monly ar« not felt on the lumber Market for some time as log
inventories may delay the incidence of the deficiency. Al
though nothing can be done directly to forestall adverse and
unseasonable weather, awareness of the nature of the problem
enables circumvention tactics by increased production during
seasonable weather,
THE PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES DEVELOPED XI PRODUCTION CONTROLS
Production controls in the timber products industry
can be envisioned as nets thrown over 31,000 sawmills; some
25,000 retail, wholesale, and concentration yards; 20,000
»aanufacturers of a multitude of wood products; over 75,000
consumers of box and crating lumber; and countless thousands
of other customers including utilities, railroads, construc
tion contractors, and millions of farmers, homeowners, and
other small consumers. The complexity becomes even more
formidable, when products other than lumber are added to the
above figures. That soiae slipped through the nets, or were
outside their reach is understandable.
Reviewed in the context of other war-time controls over
distribution of individual materials, the history of lumber
stands among the more successful examples of government man
agement in the national emergency.

A good part of the credit

for this performance must g& to the fact that luaber became

critical later in the war than most other basis materials*
imt the willingness of the top staff of the Lumber Division,
as well as the planning and policy-making personnel of the
War Production Board (WPB) and the procurement and distribu
tive personnel•of the military agencies, to lean on exper
iences of success and failure in related control problems
for other materials was almost unique.
Problems and controls influencing timber products
production and distribution, for convenience in discussion,
may be divided into these categories; (1) WPB Controls of
Production and Distribution, (2) Office of Price Administra
tion (OPA) Price Controls, and (3) Seed for Coordinated

Controls*
WPB Controls of Production and Distribution. At an
early stage in the war, controls of timber products distribu
tion split into at least five directions, reflecting the
complex and different conditions of production and distribu
tion^These lines of growth were;—(1) Control of Imported
Woods, (2) Control of Aircraft Lumber, (3) Control of Ply
wood and ¥eneer, (4) Control of Hardwood Tiaiber Products,
(5) Control of Softwood Lumber.
The first line of growth, illustrated by the controls
established over imported woods, involved woods which were
of relatively minor importance tjuanU.Uitively, but of con
siderable significance at certain key points in the war
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program.

The growth pattern for administrative management,

over foreign, woods followed a simple three-phase history;
(1) loss of, or maintenance of only a hazardous contact with,
principal sources of supply; (2) drastic limitation of ship
ping space to bring in foreign stocks; (3} issuance of VPB
control orders prohibiting virtually all non-military consumption. These orders are contained in the appendix*
The second .line of early control development was that
worked out for aircraft'lumber (principally western soft
woods: Sitka spruce$ Hoble fir, and western hemlock). The
special characteristics of producers and consumers of this
type of lumber made the control of its distribution relatively
simple. For the same reason, however, the possibilities of
extending a parallel technique to other woods were limited.
The production of aircraft lumber required top grades
of logs and skilled sawing. To secure this performance in
production, the Lumber Division, through its Western Log and
Lumber Administrator at Portland, Oregon, allocated the sup
ply of logs of Sitka spruce, western hemlock, and Noble fir
to sawmills and directed sawmills' shipments.

Any sawmill

desiring to cut lumber from these types of logs filed a
monthly allocation request with the Western Administrator.
On the basis of these applications, the Administrator allo
cated the output of specific producers to the sawmills.
Distribution of aircraft lumber by sawmill operators was also
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controlled by the Administrator through monthly shipment
directives.
A third line of control development was characterised
by the techniques worked out for plywood and veneer. The
two types of plywood, softwood and hardwood, differ markedly.
Softwood plywood is produced by a relatively small group of
plants located ia the West Coast States*

Its wartime

quantity uses were for military housing, pontoon bridges,
ship interiors, packaging, and lifeboats. Hardwood plywood
and hardwood veneers were manufactured in a number of plants,
both large and snail, some independent and others captive to
such industries as furniture. Hardwood plywood and veneer
found wartime uses in combat aircraft and training planes,
landing craft and torpedo boats, furniture and shipping con
tainers.
The early distribution history of softwood plywood
was marked by assistance for the more important direct mili
tary uses through the preference rating machinery.

Priori

ties were issued by the military agencies and the Industry
Divisions of the War Production Board.

As in so many other

instances in which the priority power was freely granted to
independent agencies and industry divisions, the Lumber
Division of the War Production Board could not exercise any
over-all integrated control.

Widespread substitution of

softwood plywood and other materials* often without regard

for its more appropriate uses, failure to screes require
ments for its more important uses, and the absence of any
procedure to provide a systematic review of orders on the
books of producers resulted in the accumulation of serious
backlog. By late spring of 1943, approximately ninety per
cent of manufacturers' shipments were being made on orders
rated AM and AA-1, while ninety-eight percent of new orders
bore AA-1 preference ratings.
Early in the war the Lumber Division made several
attempts to allocate logs to specific plywood manufacturers
to institute an allocation system for all softwood plywood
production. There was general opposition to such a program
by the military services, for reasons parallel to those
which supported the opposition of authority into the hands
of a civilian agency. The increasing pressure on producers*
backlogs, the steady deterioration in the significance of
preference ratings as applied to softwood plywood, and the
growing volume of upset production schedules resulting from
most important uses
finally forced the acceptance of a total allocation system.
The administrative aspects of this system were relatively
simple, inasmuch as the allocation machinery covered only
thirty-three manufacturiag establishments serving less than
one thousand different consumers.
As in the case of softwood plywood, hardwood veneer
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started its wartia® distribution history under the impact of
preference ratings which were extended to the manufacturers
of hardwood plywood by the producers of end products.

The

supply-demand balance, however, was considerably more favor
able and it did not prove necessary to move into an alloca
tion system. The pressure on producers was eased at least
to the balancing point through efforts to limit the quantities
of plywood going into non-essential uses.
The control problem for hardwood timber products,
which illustrates the fourth line of control technique devel
opment, was more complex.

A large number of species are

included within this general category, each with special
characteristics which adapts its use for certain purposes.
The production of each individual species is relatively small,
as is total hardwood production when compared with total
production of softwood.

The principal wartime uaes of hard

woods were in construction, mine supports, ships, aircraft,
vehicle bodies, tool handles, gun stocks, textile machinery
parts, and shoe lasts.

Over-all war distribution of hard

wood lumber was substantially in the following pattern:
factory use, thirty-four percent; box and crating, thirtynine percent! civilian construction (chiefly railroads and
defense housing), nineteen percent; and military construc
tion and Lend-Lease, eight percent.
The early approach to the control of distribution of
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hardwood timber products was through preference ratings.
For a time, the Lumber Division attempted to discourage it,
but was finally compelled to begin issuing preference ratings
in order to regain some control over distribution.

Prefer

ence ratings for hardwood lumber were being issued by the

military agencies and by some of the WPB Industry Divisions,
Sawmills found it necessary to establish a rating pattern
for their shipments in order to qualify for assistance in
procuring aaintenance and repair materials*

Only by issuing

ratings, therefore, could the Lumber Division secure delivery
on orders which it judged to be essential.

The net result of this development was a familiar
one, the race of preference ratings for the highest category*
fall control could not be exercised by the Lumber Division
while the authority to issue ratings without quantitative
restriction was retained by other divisions of the War Pro
duction Board and by the military agencies. Hardwoods,
therefor®, continued to be procured with preference ratings
for uses which the Lumber Division often appraised as non
essential.

Preference ratings assigned under the Controlled

Materials Plan for fabricated products and non-controlled
materials were often high enough to procure lumber in large
quantities for relatively non-essential uses. One of the
aiore serious situations of this type was created by the is
suance of & Controlled Materials Plan preference rating for
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a. production schedule requiring only a small allotment of
steel for nails or metal cleats, but a substantial quantity
of lumber procurable with the high rating*

This type of

activity continually negated the pattern of essentiality
established by the Lumber Division.
With production of hardwood lumber in from eight to
ten thousand small mills, located throughout the United
State® east of the Eocky Mountains, the establishment of a
distribution eontrol starting at the mill was most difficult#
The condition existing in the spring of 1943 was one of
drift. The Lumber Division assumed no responsibility for
the positive direction of the movement of hardwood. This
inertia permitted, in fact required, the Central Procuring
Agency2 of the military services to exercise positive con
trol. Enforcing no conscious direction over the distribution
of hardwood lumber, and lacking information on the character
2
The Central Procuring Agency was created on Septem
ber 1, 1942, to centralize purchasing of lumber for the War
and Navy Departments, Maritime Commission, Defense Plant
Corporation, and Lend-Lease. The principal reason for its
organisation was to cut through the confusion created by the
uncoordinated and competitive purchasing of construction lum
ber by the various service arms. As its operating experience
developed, CPA1s responsibility was extended t© cover the
procurement of lumber for any purpose in which any of the
competing services was concerned. The Central Procurement
Agency made no accounting to WPB for its purchases. Inevi
tably, the growing strength and responsibility of CPA sapped
the control authority of the Lumber Division of WPB.

and location of consumption, the Lumber Division was in the
position of observer rather than of responsible controlling
agency* 1PB control orders relating to hardwood are con
tained in the appendix,
The fifth development and chief control problem of
the Lumber Division was softwood lumber, the production of
which accounted for five-sixths of total output, and the
uses of which mounted into the thousands,

la 1942, almost

seventy-five percent of the consumption of softwood lumber
was in construction, another twenty percent was for box and
crating, .and the balance was eonsttaied in the manufacture of
wood products. In 1943, consumption for box and crating
mounted sharply, the curtailment being absorbed largely by
civilian construction*

On# other complicating factor was

introduced by the widespread production of softwood lumber
in almost 30,000 sawmills, many of which were- very small and
produced only a few inferior grades.
The softwood control problem made its appearance as
both a general problem and a series of special problems.

Aircraft lumber was predominantly softwood,

Douglas-fir, the

chief, all-purpose wood, was in demand for aircraft lumber,
ship decking, marginal planking, pontoon lumber, softwood
plywood, and other high-stress requirements. By early 19431
requirements for this species were so large that the substi
tution of structural steel for Douglas-fir was being
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encouraged—a total reversal of the 1941-42 line of material
substitution®

Douglas-fir and the other western softwoods

were also in demand for shell and ammunition containers <,
The lower grades of western softwoods and the eastern soft
woods, principally yellow pine, were in demand for construc

tion purposes, for containers, and for general manufacturing
uses,, In dealing with these diverse control problems, the
Lumber Division attempted to distinguish between the special
aad general uses of softwoods.
The first control over Douglas-fir reworked the nowfamiliar pattern*

WPB Order L-21& provided unlimited pro

curement authority for the Central Procurement Agency of the
armed services and its desi@iated contractors.

All other

distribution was subject to special authorization by the War
Production Board«

This was one more example of abdication

by the Lumber Division and the transfer of the reality of
control to the Central Procuring Agency, the actions of which
were uncontrolled and largely unreported. The control orders
relating to softwood are contained in the appendix.
Increased buying pressure on softwoods, induced par
ticularly by the control over Douglas-fir distribution, led

to the issuance of the western lumber order L-290*

Under

this order, the larger producers of the controlled species
(production in excess of 10,000 board feet daily) were pro

hibited fro.® shipping to any purchaser except to or -for the
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account of the Central Procuring Agency, on® of its designat
ed contractors, to or for the account of other government
agencies9 or on special WPB~releases«
The order accomplished for western softwoods what
L-21& had done for Douglas-fir*

The Military services were

given unrestricted procurement authority; civilian users were
compelled to apply to the Lumber Division for individual
authorisation of purchase orders,, The net gain was in two

parts:

first., the elimination of non-essential civilian uses

through screening of individual applications; and second, the

prevention of the indiscriminate issuance of rating authority
by the industry divisions of the War Production Board. The
philosophy underlying the action assumed that the elimination
of elearly non-essential civilian uses would provide enough
western lumber for all other wartime needs®

The order did

nothing to bring the reins of control within the grtsp of the
Lumber Division.
Because of the relatively wide range of substitutability between species in lumber, the successive imposition of
controls over species preferred for military purposes threw
heavy residual pressures on the remaining species, and prin
cipally on yellow pine, by far the aosfc important quantita

tively, Here finally was felt the mounting pressure of
requirements, for containers, general manufacturing uses,
and civilian construction*
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The first move toward easing the pressure was the is
suance in January, 1943, of M-206, establishing a special
rating system for non-preferred uses of lumber,, Preference
ratings were assigned to itemized us©® of lumber, with a
ceiling at AA-2X«

Inevitably, the scheme did not work,

Mil

itary and Lend-Lease ratings, and ratings issued under the

Controlled Materials Plan for fabricated products and noncontrolled materials, almost uniformly outranked M-208 rat
ings*

And beyond this difficulty was the underlying objec

tion t© the course of aetion pursued by the Lumber Division
in most of its other control actions—-unlimited authority to
assign ratings was retained by the military agencies and by
fPB*s Industry Divisions.

Within the self-imposed limits

of this situation, the Lumber -Division could act only in
terms of expediency*

It was ignorant of the consumption of

softwood lumber for each class of use and was compelled to
rely on estimates prepared by the Forest Service, which at
best were crude approximations in terms so broad as to be
useless for purposes of over-all allocation.
This was one of the most serious handicaps to the
growth of an integrated lumber distribution control system.
Beginning with the early summer of 1942, the Lumber Division
repeatedly requested the claimant agencies to submit require
ments for lumber, showing the types, species, grades, and
sines neededo 1© satisfactory requirements data were
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submitted by any claimant during the balance of the year*
It was sot until well into 1943 that the division was able
to assemble relatively complete and comparable statements
from the principal claimant agencies*

Even at this point.,

there was no way to test the validity of the stated needs*
There were a number of obstacles to the compilation
©f a complete statement of requirements. Outstanding among
them was the argument among and within the claisnants' organ
izations with respect to the size of their real lumber needs,
fhis argument was a reflection of the early neglect of lumber
as a significant war material, rapid changes in the magnitude
of requirements, and the failure to build trained staffs
capable of making the translations necessary to compile reaa«*
©nably accurate requirements estimates.

A second obstacle

was the absence of clearly defined areas of responsibility
for the presentation of requirements*

Probably the most ob

vious and difficult problem was presented by containers*
The Containers Division of the War Production Board was asked
to act as claimant for part of the supply of lumber, but no
agency was in a position to estimate its requirements of
containers.

Nor could an intelligent judgment be made by

the Lumber Division with respect to the appropriate division
of responsibility for presentation of requirements by the
military agencies^

Finally, there was no dir«®t connection

established between the presentation of requirements esti-
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oat®s and the actual procurement of lumber0

The agencies

which were called upon to submit requirements did not theoselvey directly control the procurement of the total quanti
ties for which they were standing as sponsors*

Ibis rela

tionship tended to oak® it difficult to estimate requirements,
to define areas of responsibility, and to compel the claimants

to present such estimates promptly.
In the absence of the presentation of direct require-*
ments estimates by the claimant agencies, an effort to fore
cast lumber consumption was made by the Forest Service of
the Department of Agriculture in cooperation with WPB*s
Statistics Division. These estimates divided anticipated
©oasunptloa between hardwoods and softwoods and for each of
these classifications among direct military use, indirect
military use, and civilian use. The estimates were based on
lumber content factors tested by the Forest Service over a
period of years.
The adoption of the Controlled Materials Plan as the
principal metal allocation system inevitably led to its con
sideration for lumber. The Controlled Materials Plan, how
ever, required that material be identified with its immediate
and ultimate use and associated with the end use of the final
product in which it was incorporated. This was workable
within the Controlled Materials Plan framework because the
controlled materials were almost universally purchased for
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particular production purposes and ordered in terms of

weight, sis®, and composition specifications.

Lumber, on

the other hand, was used in large quantities for boxing,
crating, dunnage, shoring, maintenance and repairs, and a
multitude of other uses for which exclusive and individual

purchase specifications were not essential. Consequently, it
was concluded that any effort to saddle the industrial system
with an unrealistic and unworkable end-use system within the
framework of flexibility in application which characterised
lumber utilization would to® likely to fail.

A different and potentially more serious problem was
presented when consideration turned to the character of lumber
producers and consumers as contrasted with the producers and.
consumers of the three major controlled materials. It was
recognised that it would be difficult to establish full con«
trol over the output of the 31,000 sawmills, most of which

were extremely small and located in remote places. These
small mills could not be expected to provide detailed re

ports on shipments and unfilled orders parallel to those
supplied, by the steel, copper, and aluminum mills*

It was

agreed at an early stage that control of lumber at the mill
shipment level could be extended only to those species pro
duced by a relatively small number of mills, each one of
which was large enough to maintain records of shipments and
to receive and summarise allotments appearing on consumer
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purchase orders.
This type of control was imposed is 1943 on the pro
ducers of western softwood and softwood plywood.

A large

part ©f the over-all lumber problem, however, centered in
woods which could not readily be ©©strolled in this way, es
pecially the southern and eastern pines, the species of
lumber produced in the greatest quantities and by the largest
number of mills.
By late 1943, the type of control represented by the
orders governing the principal hardwood and softwood species
had become inadequate; it failed to provide the management
tools required to deal intelligently and efficiently with
current problems.

Outstanding preference ratings were in

excess of supply, and control through the priority system
was breaking down. This situation paralleled in a dramatic
way the conditions governing the distribution of metals in
1941 and early 1942. The most important consumers of lumber
were free, under the existing orders, to procure and consume
without direct quantitative control over their actions.
Other essential uses were handled on a day-to-day basis with
out reference t© the total supply-demand balance as the basis
for approval or disapproval of individual requests. There
was a© opportunity to appraise one application against
another in terms of available supply and the needs of alter
native users.
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The administrative problem of controlling the produc
tion and distribution of lumber, following the inexorable
pressures of wartime demand, had progressed froa disorder
through confusion to chaos*

In teras of even minimum esti

mates, military and essential civiliaa requirementa were ia
excess of probable supply#

But complete, detailed, and

reasonably valid requirements statements had not been sub
mitted to the Lumber Division*

The Division had no practical

working control over procurement.

The military services

were permitted to buy as much lumber as they wanted, without
restriction as to species or grade*

The WPB industry divi

sions were generally free to assign preference ratings good
for quantitatively uncontrolled lumber procurement.

Impor

tant non-military and military-supporting uses, such as
containers, agriculture, railroads, and housing, were at a
disadvantage relative to the dominant procurement position
of the military agencies.

This situation was made progres

sively worse by the Lumber Division*s policy of rescuing
endangered military requirements by the issuance of orders
which denied all lumber to non-military uses except through
specific application and release.

Under this policy, there

was no assurance that essential civilian uses would receive
even their minimum requirements. For the military agencies,
the Central Procurement Agency performed a large and expand
ing function with ultimate responsibility for the procurement
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of lumber for any use in which its sponsors were interested.
A necessary concomitant of the power of the Central Procureseat Agency was the administrative weakness of th© Lumber
Division*

It was a source of power for the Central Procure

ment Agency, but its grants of management authority were is*

sued as blank checks which were always covered by restriction
of other procurement. Sine© a large part of th# demand for
lumber not provided for by Central Procurement Agency procur#stent- was of indirect military significance—as in containers,

reels, matches„ and wood products—the unrestrained purchasing
activity of the military often was the source of their own
troubles*

Beyond all else, the heart of the problem lay in

a conflict of management philosophies. The personnel of the
¥PB Lumber Division had generally accepted its function to
fee the expediting of military requirements rather than the
administration of the distribution of total lumber supply to
all claimants.
f© deal with this situation, a wholly new approach
was mad© to the problem of administrative control. An allo
cation mechanism was designed to assist the War Production
Board to prograta the distribution of lumber supply in an
orderly manner by directing available lumber to the most
essential of th® conflicting demand. The control system
provided for a quarterly summation of the requirements of
all important consumers, .and a balance of total requirements
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against total- anticipated supply for the sane period*

Gnce

a decision was reached on the quantity of lusher to he allo
cated. to each competing demand, individual consumers within
each demand area were authorised to receive lumber in ac
cordance with the over-all program determination. Inasmuch
as potential lumber users ranged .fro® the individual house
holder purchasing a few board feet to repair his fence to -the
industrial concern using a Million board feet each month to
crate manufactured equipment, a nuiaber of different proce
dures were established, each adapted to the se-gment of con
sumption and the individual consumer to which it related,
The lumber control established by WPB Order L-335 to
the spring of 1944 governed all lumber except certain species
and grades subject- to established administrative procedures.^
Under the terms of the control plan, industrial users of ®ore
than 50,000 board feet per calendar quarter made application
to the War Production Board for authorisation to purchase.
The application form called for a reporting of past and anticipated quarterly shipments of all products (mad© of wood
or not} made in each "inventory accounting, unit" of each
manufacturing plant*

Shipments of fabricated wood products

were further analyzed by preference ratings s© that the
importance of the products themselves could be appraised and

3principally aircraft grade# of Sitka spruce and Hoble
fir, shingles, lath, railway and aiae ties, hardwood floor*
lug* and log segments produced for conversion into veneer*
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the volume of their output controlled through lumber
authorisations*

Purchase requirements were submitted ia

species and thickness detail for softwoods, and species and
fprade detail for hardwoods*

Applicants also reported con

sumption by species for the preceding, calendar quarter and
end-of quarter inventories.

This group of industrial users

accounted for the bulk of the total lumber needed for woodproducts manufacture, shipping containers {produced in both
commercial and captive plants), and dunnage*

Each military

and export agency filed a master application for its total
calendar requirements of lumber to be purchased for its own
account.
Small industrial consumers (using less than 50,000
board feet quarterly) were authorised to receive lumber with*
out filing individual applications.

These small industrial

consumers were authorized to place "certified" orders for
quantities neeessary to carry out production schedules
authorised under the Controlled Materials Plan or any other
regulations of the War Production Board.
Certain large industrial users (such as mines and
smelters, petroleum companies, and construction jobs author
ized by WPB or other federal agency) were authorized to pro

cure lumber on the authority of the basic orders or certifica
tions governing their operations.

Farmers were authorised

to buy lumber by author!gation.a issued through local offices

4.8
of the War Pood Administration.

The WPB made available a

quantity of lumber for farmers which the War Food Administra
tion divided among its local offices. The County War Board
offices authorised individual farmers to purchase lumber
under quotas established for each office.
All buyers in the foregoing classes defined their
purchase orders as "certified orders»" thereby informing
their suppliers that the consumers were authorized to re
ceive the lumber ordered. Such certified orders received by
retail and wholesale lumber distributors were extendable to
the sawmills. In this way, each lumber dealer was permitted
to purchase and make available to his customers or replace
in his stock that quantity of lumber which the customers
were authorised to buy.

At the same time buyer-seller

arrangements were largely maintained, together with the ad
vantage of a continuance of the competitive relationships of
the lumber market.

The control was made complete by a pro

hibition of sawmill deliveries except on certified orders.
No preference ratings were issued under the lumber
control plan established under WPB Order L-335. When con
sumers had ratings to get production materials for a product,
maintenance materials, or operating supplies, they used the
same rating to obtain lumber. If the consumer did not have
* rating he got one in the same way as a rating for any
other material (except farmers who got a rating through the
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lar Food Administration).
The control provided both th© information and the
administrative machinery required to balance supply and
demand each calendar quarter, to cut back less essential
requirements to the extend necessary to satisfy more essen
tial needs, to justify the cutbacks by reference to the more
important claims against available supply, to distribute pro
curement authorisations to individual consumers within th®
over-all pattern established by Requirements Committee deter
mination, and to assure the orderly distribution of lumber
from sawmill to ultimate consumer so as to secure the most
effective utilization of all types of lumber for the total
war program. In the application of the control, the total
quantity of lumber for which certified orders could be placed
•fc-

was limited to tc^al supply.

Each lumber user had reasonable

assurance that the quantity of lumber he was authorized to
receive during the succeeding calendar quarter actually
would be delivered. Integration of the machinery with other
isPB controls provided for the distribution of lumber to
authorized programs in such aanner as to support levels of
production for which other critical materials had been al
located.
Probably the aost important change introduced by
L-335 was its organization of a new philosophy of distribu
tion control* Fro® the beginning of the war production
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drive until the spring of 1944, military procurement of
lumber had been free fro® all restrictions, the policy of
the WPB Lumber Division, stressed ia all of its limitation
and conservation orders, had been to facilitate every direct
Military need, without review of its urgency ©r of the impact
of unlimited military purchasing on other lumber require
ments, Many of which had an important relation to the ful
fillment of military programs.

The net effect of this policy

had been to lodge in the hands of the Central Procuremeut
Agency acting for the military services whatever measure of
control existed over lumber and to leave a minimum of resid
ual authority in the iMmbmr Division of the War Production
Board. Order L-335 accomplished a complete reversal of this
position.

Allocations of specified quantities of lumber

were mad© to the military agencies. Indirect Military re
quirements were given adequate protection within the limits
of anticipated supply, as were export and essential domeatle
civilian needs. Artificial deficits, created by the common
practice of multiple placement of purchase orders, were removed. And above all, the focal point for control, together
with responsibility for its administration, was reassigned
to the War Production Board, the only effective source of
management for an integrated control system.
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OPA Price Controls, la so far as timber product

prices were controlled against the market forces of supply
and demand and in so far as these controls were unbalanced
with other commodities as well as between various tiaber
products, there were prise problems that influenced produc
tion*
Long before the declaration of war, leaders in busi
ness and government were fully aware that stringent action
would have to be taken to prevent a run-away inflation. The
public wanted the Government to hold down the cost of living,
but there was little realization that inflation controls
would require the sacrifice of immediate financial gains for
the more lasting benefits of a stable economy.
There were advanced two general approaches to the
problem of economic stabilization. The first (Baruch Plan}
requested a general eeiling on every item of commerce or
service.
V
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economy, agriculture, labor, and business would be treated
as parts of a single, living, sensitive organism. An es
sential condition of the Baruch Plan was that the general
ceilings be established on "somm date on which the normal
operation of the law of supply and demand cas be said to have
controlled prices."

Thus, adjustments would be necessary
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only to adjust prices which for one reason or another were
not at satisfactory levels on the base date.
The alternative to a general ceiling was "piecemeal
prise fixing."

Under this plan ceilings would be placed on

the prices of commodities as and when they exhibited infla
tionary behavior. It was thought that this selective
approach would permit the prices of individual confaodities
to rist when increased supplies were needed, for defense pro
duction.

Moreover, the Government would be able to deal

with dangerous price rises as they occurred without regulat
ing the entire economy.

However, in practice, commodity

price controls could not prevent increases in the cost of
living, as long as consumer purchasing power exceeded the
available supply of goods. It therefore became necessary
to supplement price control with other anti-inflation de
vices—wage stabilization, increased taxes, appeals for
increased savings, and reduction in installment credit. By
the end of January, 1942, the Emergency Price Control Bill
became law.
The chronological list of price regulations governing
timber products, in general, reflects the emergence of the
various commodities as problems. During prestatutory OPA
fifty percent of wholesale prices were brought under control
with 105 Price Schedules (PS), 120 voluntary price agree
ment®, warning letters and suggestions--the so-called
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"Jawbone Control.n

Later, these were reissued under the

law and also Maximum Price Regulations (MPS) were establish
ed. The Maximum Price Regulations that were issued for
primary forest products are listed in th© appendix.
Meed For Coordinated Controls.

Measures necessary for

th© control of timber products must necessarily be geared to
any general system of managing the economy.

Mo industry or

segment thereof can be treated individually with any exten
sive degree of success.

The present economic structure is

so interwoven that to disturb one part of the whole soon
produces repercussions felt more-or-less throughout the whole
structure.

All economic controls must be coordinated to

result in a smooth functioning economic machine.
The previous section dealing with price controls
hinted at the ramified nature of the problem . It is quite
obvious that any industry such as the timber industry cannot
effectively be placed under price controls while the rest of
the economy is left to function freely. Less understood are
the guide lines to preserve the inter-price ratios between
industries when all are brought under control, as well as th#
maintenance of intra-price relationships within industries.
Khen price control policies deviate fro® the established
pattern of prices, economic stresses and strains are set up.
For example 9 an. out-of-line price on structural steel might
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shift demand in the construction industry toward concrete
which in turn might increase the demand for lumber to build
forms»

Also, within the timber industry for example, a dis

proportionately high celling on palp logs and bolts might
unduly attract t© the paper manufacturers the critically
needed raw Materials of the lumber, pole, Bine timber, and
other such timber products industries.

The sensitivity of

prices and the market activity they may cause is quite varied
between products, legislations placed on prices to control
Inflation or direct production mast be wisely done to avoid
inequity and distorted results.
The prior section that treated War Production Board
controls was purposely narrowly Halted to the timber products
industry.

Even when the discussion was confined to that

industry the problem was not simple. Ihen the complexity of
production controls in the timber products industry is further
confounded with the problems of inter-industry relationships,
the difficulty in its true light can be appreciated.

An

example of the inter-industry type of production problem was
that of manpower. Sow skilled timber workers were lured to
higher paying industries, and how the industry suffered, at

least for a tine, at the hands of indiscriminate draft
boards have been already recounted»

Similarly, the alloca

tion of equipment, supplies, food, and clothing must be
equitably distributed to all Industries including the timber
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products industry., In addition, a just distribution of the
essentials of production roust be balanced within an industry
not only among its various segments, bat also between large
and small operators In order to assure maxirrdzsd productive
efficiency.
The tremendous job of .managing the economy can be
divided into two major categories. The first category is
the problem of providing suitable and workable controls of

all significant cofflaoditi.es and services, and the other
problematical category is to coordinate these controls into
a smooth functioning and efficiently productive economy, It
is certainly a job to challenge the finest brains of the
country.

CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS OP THE PURCHASER OR CONSUMER
(PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS}
Production of adequate and satisfactory products for
war is an enormous problem.

Part of that problem is for

manufacturers to know how much and what kind of commodities
to make.

Then, too, few goods are used where they are made,

so a further task is to see that they are transported to con
sumption points at the proper time in quantities and qualities
desired. Finally, the Batter of payment in proper amount,
after the order is satisfactorily filled, completes the
transaction.

Procurement may cover this whole field from

advising the manufacturer what to produce to the final check
ing and payment of the delivered articles.

In this section

of the report only the procurement problems in obtaining
timber products for the Army, Navy, Defense Plant Corporation,
War Shipping Administration, Lend-Lease, and the Maritime
Commission are considered.
During the war period some six billion dollars were
spent to procure timber products for the above six agencies.
When the si&e of that purchasing job, together with speci
fication complexities, and price and transportation dif
ficulties are considered in providing such commodities as
construction lumber, aircraft veneer, and white oak for ships;
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the monumental stature of the task can be appreciated. The

problems encountered in procurement can usually be relegated
to one or more of the following categories!

{1} Organisa

tional and administrative problems, (2) Specification problems, or (3) Distribution problems®

It is futile to try to evaluate one category oyer the
others as the more important of the procurement problems,
Commonly they existed together, and to try and establish
individual importance would be but academice

Perhaps the

most obvious problem and the one that first caused an un
mistakable bottleneck was the organizational difficulty

encountered in tgiing to procure as usual in the rocketing
expansion for defense. Procurement in this situation night
be termed the pre~Cantral Procurement Agency Period which
existed until Septeiaber 1, 1942.

How the six agencies ob

tained their timber requirements before the establishment of
the CPA follows:
The Army, prior to 1942, delegated its timber product

procurement activity to nearly all of the technical branches.
However, by far the balk of these products was obtained
through the Procuring and Expediting Section of the Office

of the Quartermaster General. The Construction Division of
the Quartermaster *Corps was charged with troop housing and

facilities at camps, posts, and stations both in the zone of
interior and at foreign installations, as well as other Army
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facilities construction»
Similarly* nearly all bureaus of the Navy procured
timber products for tiieir own requirements, but under a gen
eral tendency to centralize such procurement in the Bireau
of Supplies and Accounts*

Am important exception to this

tendency was new shore installation construction which was
handled fey the Bureau of lards and Docks or its contractors.
Obtaining timber products for ship building was a function

of contractors engaged in ship construction, the Bureau of
Ships, and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
The War Shipping Administration, Maritime Commission,

and the Defense Plant Corporation were not directly involved
with procurement of timber products®

It was the responsibil

ity of their contractors to procure their requirements®

Pur

chases for lend-lease accounts were handled by procurement
officials of the Treasury Department.
Hie usual government procedure in procuring supplies
is to offer invitations to bid, setting forth coaasodity
descriptions, specifications, quantities required, and other

pertinent Information. Bids are received, evaluated, and
accepted or rejected»

This method supposedly assures free

competition, resulting in the greatest value for money ex
pended by the Government®

Actually, it is sometimes a

cumbersome and somewhat costly arrangement»

When the floods of d#f#n®« buying and construction,
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were loosed in 1941, the usual procurement methods bogged
iown*

A vivid example of why this happened is shown in the

following sketch of one of the first large Army lumber pro
curement jobs®

Two million feet of lamb®? was required for

four new Army easaps*

Invitations to bid on the project were

sent out in accordance with the .usual procedure.

Three

hundred thousand sheets of paper were used in the coapilatioa
of these bids; more than 250,000 prices were swbuitted*

Froa

a pool of accountants awaiting Government assignment, the
Army borrowed thirty accountants who worked night and day for
ten days in an effort to organize the multitudinous bids into

a shape where awards could be made*
busy writing telegrams alone.®

Twenty typists were kept

The abstract sheet on this

job was five feet wide and 120 feet long and it took so many
weeks to reach the award stage that when the successful

bidders were notified, the stock upon which they had made
their bids had reached various stages of depletion.
To cut through the red tape and expedite lumber pro
curement the Quartermaster Corps of the Army developed .an

auction system of buying timber products,.

Vendors were

notified of the time, place» and quantities of timber prod
ucts to be bought.

At the auction3 and with the requirements

iternizedj the suppliers could bid on as much as they felt
they could supply«

Awards were made to the lowest bidder.

If a representative of the using agency of the contractor
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was present, the contracts were drawn on the spot. In any
case, the supplier could notify htis sawmill and production
could be started immediately and the recipient, if not pres

ent, could confirm the bid by telephone or wire and contrast
could be drawn up later*
The fiavy had a procurement plan that lay somewhere
between the usual bid procedure and the A ray auction plan.
They organized prospective suppliers into groups and rotated
the opportunities to bid among the groups.
In addition to the problem of the tremendous amount
of paper work under the procurement-as-usual setup, there
were other complicating and confusing factors.

The unre

stricted competition between the various government agencies,
war contractors and civilian interests had detrimental
effects on timber products procurements
rapidly as demand exceeded supply*

Prices began to ris#

This commonly channeled

the lumber and other timber products to the buyer who could
pay the most for it, regardless of the essentiality of the
ultimate use.

This situation brought a plague upon suppliers

is the forti of hordes of experienced and inexperienced buyers
plus a general abundance of ssealous expediters. Producers
complained of the large amounts of their time required to

deal with the numerous public and private buyers and expeditors*

It is hard to evaluate the production loss occasioned

by the surplus of these procurers9 but the tendency is to
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underestimate it.
Uncontrolled, competitive purchasing also caused
actual misuse aad wast® of the production facilities of the
industry.

Mills often not equipped to produce special prod*

ucts would accept such orders with patriotic motives, while

better equipped mills were producing less essential items.
Maldistribution of available supplies of timber
products, was another and important consequence of decentral
ized procurement*

There were instances where local and

relatively small quantities of materials were vitally needed
but which could not be filled because the total local sup*
ply was drained away in large shipments for camps, ships,
or factory construction®

Sometimes large contractors, need

ing a relatively few items or goods, would purchase the
entire output of a mill aad resell what they did not want to
largely non-essential users.

Even between essential users

it was to be expected that some contractors and agencies
were better organized, more efficient, and perhaps more ag
gressive than others*

This contributed so seriously t©

.maldistribution that the issue had to be solved«

In December, 1941, the Amy construction program was
transferred to the Corps of Engineers. The auction plan of
procurement of timber products was continued to such good

effect that soon the Army was getting nearly all of its
requirements and other agencies and contractors w®ra
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experiencing difficulty,, In order to solve this situation,
a Central Procuring Agency was established in the Corps of
Engineers on September 1» 1942®

The principal reason for

its organization was to alleviate maldistribution of con
struction lumber and to cut through the confusion created by
the uncoordinated and competitive purchasing by the various
agencies and defease contractors#

It centralised the pro

curement of timber products for the Mar and lavy Departments,
Maritime Commission, War Shipping Administration, Defense
Plant Corporation and Lend-Leas®, including the contractors
to these government agencies®
Procurement through CPA was quite simple ia process.
Eequests for materials were submitted to CPA by the using
Service for both their own and their contractors* needs as
they arose, CPA would place the items up for bid at their
next auction or if the need was great enough a special
auction might be called.

Procurement was also made by direct

negotiation with the vendor or by mean® of sealed bids, but
the auction system was moat widely used and satisfied most of
the requirements®

' •

Procuring for the several agencies places CPA in a
semi-judicial role in allocating the scarce lumber to the

various users*

For guidance in allocating critical iteas

when inter-agency demands conflicted, CPA was buttressed by
a Luaber Advisory Board» ©©agisting of a representative of

each using agency. If the conflict could not be resolved
there, appeal was provided to the Lumber Committee of the

Army and Navy Munitions Board®

It speaks well of the cooper™

ation between the lumber-using agencies that reference to

higher authority was never necessary by the Advisory Board„
S&me of the procurement prob3.ems were not solved even
by the improvements inaugurated under the CPA system.

The

problem of opacifications was notably in this category.

Specification problems can be generalized into three cate
gories:

Specifications were either (1) too high, (2) too

low, or (3) were uncommon or otherwise problematical.

Specifications considered to® high nay be completely
Justified and if so the problem was then one of inadequate
forest resources or other production problems. Where the
specifications are considered too high and less exacting
qualities would suffice, it was a procurement problem.

An

example of the latter sort occurred in the change-over from
pre-war to the expansion for defense„

During the relative

trickle of pre-war purchases, some high specification items
were procured with no trouble or question#

However, when

the war expansion required large volumes of these stringent*®
ly specified items bottlenecks aros® due to blind insistence

©n the established specifications®

A reappraisal of them

might have lowered the threshold, enabling the fulfillment
of reqmir»««Bts on at least some of the critical items,*

In
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a buyer1 s market a. vendor will tolerate elaborately exact
specifications, but in a shift to a seller's market, as oc~

curred early in the war period, suppliers were quick to sidestep items difficult to supply, and inordinately high specit

fications provided a real, but artificial shortage*

Hie

t

obvious solution is a constant, technical, and critical

attitude on all specifications, a weighing appraisal of
specification changes to avoid confusion and production al
terations, and careful designing, where applicable, to put
requirements within easily supplied specifications*
Specifications that were too low were infrequent and
not of much consequence, The damage in this case arises in
excessive replacement, of the too lowly specified items„

For

example, difficulty was experienced during the war in pro
curing 5/4 (l§~*ineh thick) lumber that was sufficiently dry
to meet the specifications for tent pins.

When the specifi

cations were lowered to include 4/4 stock, the requirements
were met but the pins split so easily that It necessitated
the purchase of greater quantitiestlnfaailiarity with the timber products industry and
the properties and characteristics of the various wood
species was perhaps the most important factor leading to un~
commonness and other difficulties in writing specifications.
Examples of this sort arose in some of the early cantonment
designs*

Some were based mm a 10-foot module, requiring
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dimension lumber ia that length.

This is an uncommon lumber

length, since most logs are cut eight or sixteen feet long,
fo produce large numbers of 10-foot pieces requirts cutting
th® lumberf resulting in waste of Materials and time.

In

another instance ia krmj post theatre designs, unusually long
dimension lumber wms specified for the back of the stage*
These and other mischance specifications caused considerable

delays and unfilled orders which could have been eliminated
by proper design and specification supervision.

Analysis of the CPA Inquiry Files {requests for lumber
by the using agency) showed that three-fourths of the speci

fication problems originated on the buying side; whereas,
the other fourth of the problems clustered around the pro
ducer. Two-thirds of all the specification problems were
caused by changes ia the specifications or plans; a fourth
by the vendor being unable to meet th® specifications; and
about ten percent of the problems was caused by materials
ordered not being suited for the job. The incidence of
specification problems, as would be expected, was heavier at
the start of the defense mobilisation*

They increased in

numbers until the fourth quarter of 1943* when they started
declining.

A sharp drop in specification problems by the

aiddle of 1944 was interpreted as the result of corrective
action on specifications to bring them into line with the
industry* s ability to fill, aa well as the lowered lumber
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eonsusipti©a from the 1942-43 peak®
Efficient transportation is a necessary accomplice in
procurement-producer teamwork#

The War Production Board,

estimated 1.5 million carloads of lumber were shipped in
1942•

Transportation was & tremendous job all through the

war. Soae abases were perhaps unavoidable; many of the dif

ficulties and inefficiencies might have been eliminated.
Cross-hauls of lumber between producing areas was a
waste of valuable transportation equipment and time.

Un

coordinated purchasing was a factor ia this situation. For
example, in 1942, 18,75^ carloads of softwood lumber were
shipped into the Southern Pine Producing Area froa the Pa
cific Northwest, while 636 cars, during the same year, hauled
southern pine lumber into the Pacific Northwest.

Part of

such seeming transportation waste was justified by military

necessities, but the part that can be minimized by planning
and coordination should be accomplished.
The common .military transportation problem of assembl
ing materials in central depots only to be later reshipped to
the areas from which they came also figured in wasted lumber
movements*

Also, the usual rail shipping problems of getting

orders in even car amounts, obtaining prompt unloading®, fur
nishing government bills of lading, and having the necessary

car requirements {especially gondola cars} posed many mis
cellaneous procurement hindrances attributable to transporta
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tion, It can be assumed that the- responsible authorities
ia most of these and similar cases aim to keep these imped*
iments at a toinifauii,,
Manpower problems, forest resource depletion, and
other factors had closed down some 9,500 sawmills by 1944*
This

put

t ransport at,ioa in shipping lumber
supplied by local mills. This rela

an added burden, on

to these .areas formerly
tively small

increased

transportation problem serves to

focus attention on the basic need for well-distributed and

adequate, forest resources..
Besides transportation as a procurement difficulty!
there were two other factors that affected distribution;
namely, prices and delayed payments®
-Unintentional influences brought about by OPA regula
tions caused some procurement

impediments3

One example of

this type of difficulty was. news-leaks of forthcoming price
ceiling increases, which caused operators to hold up ship
ments ia order to gain the additional remuneration. Later,
this sort of problem -was minimised when shipments under ex
isting contracts were assured of any subsequent price raises..
The price-, procurement probleii prior to OPA centered around

bidding up critically needed timber products to perhaps
exceptional cost to the government*

Vers

After OPA regulations

established, prices were not allowed free movement

to bring forth needed production of critical

items while
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curtailing manufacture of plentiful commodities. This
caused some price procurement problems.

OPA responded with

mme price adjustments, but in so far as they were delayed,
inadequate, or not allowed, procurement was handicapped.
Belayed payments for timber products delivered to the
government caused various degrees of procurement difficulties*

There were examples of five to six months' delay in payment
©f some orders.

Most producers are financially unable to

carry such commitments and it is perhaps illogical and im
proper to expect the® willingly to do so. Some difficulties
arose due to the inability to bring destination receipts
into agreement with shipment bills.

Car tallies not being

included in some shipments, caused some later discrepancies.
The sis© of the emergency shipments; the usual, hectic
construction scenes at receiving points; and the somewhat
intricate government procurement channels, fiscal procedures,
and accounting methods all added up to reason for payment
delays, tout nevertheless, that appeared as insufficient
justification to some operators who hesitated in selling t#
the government for this reason.

CHAPTER IY
WEIGHING Til SITUATION FOR THE FUTURE
Some problems of timber products production, and
procurement will undoubtedly be different in another emer
gency*

Instead of shuttle blocks and shunt -poles being in

short supply, for example, ski blanks and snowshoe frames
may be the critical items. But, whatever the pattern of war
demands, wood will be called upon to fill a host of uses*
%hat could take the place of lumber and plywood for construc
tion and crating, poles and piling for their uses, and rail
road ties in the nation's transportation system?

The timber

demands for these and other uses aight rise to staggering
proportions should American cities come under military
action.
Foremost in an appraisal of the timber products situ
ation to meet another emergency must com© the question of
forest resources*

The true importance of this factor of

production was obscured in the last war by other more immed
iate and more easily correctable factors, such as manpower,

equipment, production controls, and procurement procedures.
To gauge the full importance of the forest resource factor,
imagine perfect and easily reached forests by every saw
mill; abundant, quality logs for all the veneer lathes; and
the necessary species, volumes, and qualities needed t# fill

70
the other timber products requirements®

la this situation

timber products production or procurement problems would be
insignificant^

It is the forest resource problem that is

the heart and the key to the difficulty.
The forest resource shortage largely explains the
current and significant high price of lumber which is fifty
percent la excess of the price index for other building com*
modities; the migration of the lumber industry across the
coatiaent aad the present decline ia numbers of large saw-

stills; the lengthening hauls from woods to mills; the begin
ning exodus of the plywood veneer mills from the long-time
center around Puget Sound to northern California; the in
creased pressure la demands for national forest stumpage;
these and other weather vanes indicate without question the
depletion of our timber resources*
The dwiadliag volume of standiag sawtimber is but oae

facet of the problem. The volume remaining is aot well dis
tributed*

In the West, the last stronghold of virgin timber,

sixty-five percent of the standing volume of sawtimber is
growiag oa but tweaty-three percent of the national sawtimber
area®

The North and South are characterised by forests that

have been cut-over aad depleted„

la the South an increasing

number of mills are euttiag six-inch trees aad it is aot
uncommon to see a logging truck carrying fifty or more logs*
Obviously9 mills operate ,m such small logs only because the
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supply of larger timber is scare®. The maldistribution of
the remaining sawtiaber also adds to the nation5 s transporta
tion problem.
In addition to the standing sawtiraber bsiag depleted
and that what remains being centered largely ia the north-*
west, the age classes in the nation'a forest growing stock
art unbalanced and otherwise deficient to assure a sustained
production of timber*

la the North, for an example of poorly

balanced age classes, almost half the commercial forest land
bears only seedlings or is denuded*

There are great areas

of land that could be in process of 'growing timber, but by
negligence and lack of foresight are not fully productive,
either by being inadequately stocked or completely denuded.
For the country as a whole there is prevalent understocking.
About thirty-six percent of all the commercial forest land
is deforested or has less than forty percent of the number
of trees required for full stocking®

Concomitant problems

of growing adequate timber supplies is the enormous noncommodity drain from our forests in the fora of fire, insect,
disease, and wind, ice and other damage *

Over the entire

forest problem and adding to its complexity is the intricate
ownership pattern between federal, sub-ordinate governments
and private owners.
The concept of comparing the national timber growth
with tiaber drain to weigh the sustained yield possibilities

72
has many limitations that can only be suggested here*

Soma

persons in the industry point to the near balance of alltimber growth and drain at around thirteen billion cubic feet
per year*

fMs apparent balance Masks a number of serious

deceptions among which are: (1) the unbalanced age classes
which causes too mush of the growth to occur on very young
trees; (2) the heavy cutting of desirable species, which
makes much of the growth figure upon undesirable species;
and (3) the distinction that four-fifths of the drain comes
from sawtimber while growth of trees in that category fall
short of meeting the drain by fifty percent. Proa the econom
ic standpoint a future balance Might be achieved in several
different ways®
Augmented imports of raw timber materials and prod~
ucts is one way to bring about a balance, but such optimism

is limited as there is less opportunity to increase our im
ports than might be supposed.

Although traditionally consid

ered as timber exporter to the world, since 1940 this
country has been on a net import basis for lumber. However,
the net Imports of lumber represent less than two percent of

total lumber production®

Similarly, the imports and exports

of railroad ties, plywood and veneer, and poles and piles

are a very small percentage of total production of these
commodities•

The North Temperate Zone softwood or conifer

forests are by far the most important source of the world*s
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timber supply. Significantly, Russia possesses one-third of
this supply. There is no indication that the fabulous tropi
cal forests can take the place of the North Temperate Eon©
softwoods*

All in all, there is a world shortage as well as

a domestic shortage of timber.
An undesirable method of balancing our timber budget
would be to allow increasing shortages of timber to develop
and the balance com© about in the forest products market
through substantially increased wood prices and consequent
curtailment in consumption*

From a military standpoint alone8

such a course is untenable.
There is no easy way and no substitute for a farreaching program to bring the nation* s forests under good
management to insure timber products for the future. It is
a possibility that the present elouded international situa
tion will not precipitate into World War III, but will remaia
a continuous emergency, a conflict of attrition®

In any

case, the close correlation between the adequacy of the for
ests of the country and its economic well-being has long been
recognized. One of our foremost economists,1 in analysing
the future national income of the United States, predicted
that in expansion of output the economy would consume more
raw materials in the next thirty years than have been con

*8uaner U* Slighter, wMow Big im I9$0n» the Atlantic.
November, 1949»
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sumed in the last century and a half. Wood is one of these
raw materials.
On the forest resource problem the nation faces some*

thing of a dilemua.

The cry is to increase output. let even

the present rate of sawtiraber cutting exceeds the annual
growth.

The job is a long time one and treraendous, but not

hopeless.

The problem should be attacked quickly, it worsens

with drifting and delay.

The former abundance of our forest

resources has unfortunately tended to camouflage their vital
importance. It seems prudent militery planning that the
decline of our forest resource to® checked and revised.

De

tailed treatment of the problem with reco»mendations is con
tained in another report.^
A principal, immediate concern in an emergency is the
status of timber products inventories throughout the country.
The booming construction period following the war delayed
filling the war-spent lumber stocks. However, by the end of
1949 the war-low lumber inventory figure of 4*6 billion board
feet had been raised to about half the pre-war inventory of
eighteen billion feet.
estimated at

nine

At the end of 1950, the figure was

billion board feet.

Plywood and veneer

atocka have never been more than insignificant in recent

2"Forests

and National Prosperity, A Reappraisal of
the Forest Situation in the United states,* Forest Service,
ISM, Misc. Pub. No. 668.
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years due to incessant demand.

Railroad ties, poles and

filing stocks are about normal. Th© long seasoning period
for these items is an important consideration in judging
stocks. It is important that the budding National Production
Authority controls do not interfere with the building of
plentiful timber products inventories. Currently, there is
some danger in this direction.
In order to assure the best and most efficient us® of
the forest resources and stocks of timber products on hand
in another war emergency» th® Forest Products Committee of
the Munitions Board made the following immediate recommenda
tions:^
Actions which should be started
in* advance of an emergency
1.

Establishment of a "critical list® of timber
products.

2.

Export controls for products on the critical list#

3. Stocking products on th® critical list.
4. Building up, if feasible, mill and distribution
yard stocks to form an adequate cushion against a
sudden increase in military construction require
ments.

3Interim Report to Munitions Board from the Forest
Praduet# Gosaiaittee, July 19, 1946.

5*

Accelerated research in the improved utilization

of wood, development of substitutes, etc., as a
means of conserving the supply of usable timber.
6. Intensive field surveys to determine location and
volume of stands of specialty and quality timber.
7.

A large-scale program of access road construction
on public lands.
A comprehensive program of statistical informa
tion on forest products.

9. Advance planning of the timber controls to be
instituted at the start of an emergency, including
adequate estimation of military requirements by
the Department of National Defense.
Actions which should be taken
at the onset of an emergency
1. Over-all allocation of all forest products in
short supply.
2. Complete control over inventories,
3. Full coverage by appropriate conservation, liaitation and preference rating orders,
4. Issuance of cutting directives to producers.
5. Subsidising high-cost producers.
6. Subventions to producers to maximize production
of critical it#««#
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7. Special aids to producers in the procurement of
stumpage.
8.

Technical advice and assistance to producers,

9. Putting in the field an adequate force of for
esters and other technicians to facilitate the
various production-incentive programs, and to en
courage leaving land in productive condition.
Since forest products production is intimately con
nected at all levels with the rest of the economy, the
Forest Products Committee recognized that it should be
equitably treated in the over-all control of industry*

the

nature of the timber-products industries is such that extra
ordinary measures are required in certain fields. They sug
gested the following actions?
1. Control over employment, wages and hours, so that
skilled woods and mill workers can be retained,
the necessary additional labor recruited, and pir
ating of labor by better-paid industries eliminat
ed.
2. Control over all supplies and equipment, so that
the necessary food, clothing, fuel, trucks, trac
tors, etc., can be channeled where most needed to
increase production.
3. Control over all prices of timber products in
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short supply, and possibly stumpage as well, as
a part of over-all prist control assumed to be
necessary in an emergency, and to prevent serious
dislocations ia the flow of essential timber prod
ucts to authorized consumers.
4»

Control over all transportation facilities so
that timber products can be Moved without undue
delay t© authorised consumers and t© consumption
points where most urgently needed.
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APPEIDXX
A SUMMARY OF CONTROL MEASURES IN WORLD WAR II
APPLYING tO LUMBER AID OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS
(EXCEPT WOOD PULP AID PAPER PRODUCTS)1
The Office of Production Management, and later the War
Production Board, the Civilian Production Adoinistrat ion, and
the Office of lousing Expediter issued general priorities
regulations under which business operated during the emer
gency.
The purpose of these regulations was to state the
basic rules which applied to all business transactions unless
covered by more specific regulations or superseding orders.
In general, the priorities regulations established preference
ratings, limitations on inventories, allocation classification
systems, production requirements plans, and the procedures for
obtaining and assigning preference ratings, duration of pref
erence rating orders, acceptance of orders, sequence of deliv
ery, appeals from specified orders, and other procedures nec
essary to the operation of the priorities system.
The Office of Price Administration was an agency
established to control prices in the managed war-time econ
omy in an effort to avoid inflation. The approach of this
authority was similarly by a General Maximum Price Regulation
from which later specific commodities were excepted and spe
cifically controlled»
Specific regulation of forest products (except pulp
and paper) by both production and price authorities are
listed belowi
War Production Board Conservation Orders - "y Series
{To curtail the use of" critical Material's) '
H-63

General laaaort Order. (December 1941). To conserve
the supply anS" direct the distribution of strategic
materials in which shortages exist and which are im
ported. The forest products covered and the data

From Materials Survey, U.S. Dept. Agriculture, 1950*
Complete details on all. control measures matj to# found la ap
propriate issues of the- Federal Register.

ai

when they were included in the order follow;
1©

Logs and Lumber:
a. Balsa (June 1942}
b. Mahogany (June 1942}
c. Boxwood (June 1942}
d. Prima vera {April 1943)
e. Spanish cedar (April 1943)
f. Fir, other than Douglas-fir (April 1943)
g. Pine, other than northern white and
Norway (April 1943)
h. Albarco (Jane 19431

2.

Tannin wood, hark, or extract:
a. Quebracho (Jane 1942)
b. Mangrove (lay 1943)

3. Charcoal (June 1942)
4. Pulpwood {January 1944)
Order ff-63 revoked May 1947»
M~$3.

Teak* General Preference Order* (March 1942). To
conserve the supply and direct the distribution of
teak to meet military requirements, chiefly for ship
decking. Revoked March 1943.

w-122. Mahogany and Philippine Mahogany. General Conserva
tion Order. (May 194217 '&> restrict the sale, deliv
ery, production and use of mahogany, Philippine ma
hogany, and albarco to aeet military requirements,
chiefly for aircraft, boat, and ship building, Re
voked September 1945*

5.-177. Balsa. General Conservation Order. (August 1942).
To restrict the sale, delivery, production and use of
balsa to meet military requirements, principally for
life preserving equipment, aircraft, buoys, ship build
ing, and gyroscopic equipment. Revoked July 1945•
K-186. Sitka Spruce Logs. General Preference Order. (July
1942). To allocate and restrict the use of aircraft
grades of Sitka spruce logs and lumber to meet mili
tary requirements. Revoked September 1945*
M-208. Softwood Lumber. Conservation Order. (August 1942).
To control the distribution and use of all types and
grades of softwood lum&er through the establishment of
preference ratings* Revoked August 1944. Superseded
by Order L-335.
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11-209. White Oak. General Conservation Order, {August
1942)". To restrict the us® of white oak logs wholly
for fabrication into implements of war, chiefly air
craft, weapons, ships, tanks, and vehicles. Expired
November 1943»
14-228. Noble Fir Logs. General Preference Order. (Septem
ber 1942}. To allocate and direet, or prohibit, the
us® of loble fir logs, or any part sawed therefrom,
to meet military requirements, principally for air
craft. loble fir was the most desirable alternate
for Sitka spruce* Revoked May 1944* Renewed by es
tablishment of Order M-3&6, February 1945«
K-229. Western Hemlock Aircraft Lsms* General Preference
Order. (Septeraber'1^42}. ¥0 allocate and direct, or
prohibit, the use of western hemlock aircraft logs,
or any part sawed therefrom, to meet military require
ments. Revoked April 1944.
M-234* Douglas-fir Logs. General Preference Order. (Septem
ber 1942). to allocate specific quantities of Douglasfir logs, or any part sawed therefrom, to specific
persona, and to direct or prohibit particular uses of
such logs, or the production by any person of partic
ular lumber items from such logs, to meet direct and
indirect military requirements, such as aircraft
material, pontoon lumber, ship decking, planking, and
plywood. Revoked September 1945.
M-248. Rattan. General Conservation Order. {October 1942).
To restrict the sale, delivery, processing, and use
of rattan (virtually all of foreign origin) to meet
siilitary requirements, chiefly for boat fenders, hos
pital wheel chairs, use in occupational therapy, para
chute rings, and cap bands. Revoked September 1945.
14-251. Pulpwoods General Preference Order. (October 1942).
To' control the distribution and use of pulpwood
through allocation and to direct it to specific prod
ucts or purposes; to require the establishment of re
serve supplies; and to limit or prohibit particular
uses of designated types in any area where a shortage
is found to exist in order to meet military and essen
tial civilian requirements, levoked August 1945.
1-277. Vegetable fanning Materials. General Conservation
Order* "TFebruary 1943)* To restrict the distribution
and um of domestic and foreign supplies of vegetable
tanning materials to meet military and essential

S3
• civilian uses. The order covered the following domes
tic raw materials and extracts: C&lifqraia pate bark,
cellulose sulphite by-products {deleted 'MarcnsSTTT
cheatnut oak bark* chestnut wood, healock bark* and
suaac. Chestnut extract (indispensable in the tanning
of sioe sole leather, transmission belting, and other
heavy leather products) was placed under complete al
location January 1944- Revoked November 1946.
11-279» Yellow Poplar. General Conservation Order. {February 1943)« To allocate yellow poplar aircraft logs
and direct their•production into aircraft-type lumber
and veneer to meet military requirements. Revoked
November 1943.
H-2&9* Charcoal. General Preference Order. (February 19431*
fo restrict distribution and use of charcoal by large
users to meet military and essential civilian needs,
chiefly for processing metals and curing meat and to
bacco. Revoked September 1945.
H-300. Chemicals. General Allocation Order,,
Fine far. Schedule 14 {April 1944). To estab
lish authority to allocate pine tar and tar oil
obtained by distillation of pine wood by the re«
tort or kiln process for purpose of meeting mil
itary and essential civilian uses, chiefly for
rubber compounding and reclaiming, cordage for
fishing nets, oakum for lavy ship building, and
veterinary and pharmaceutical uses. Revoked
July 1945. Superseded by Order 1-340, September
1945*
Pine Oil. Schedule 73 (ffovaaber11944). To
transfer the allocation provisions of Order
M~365» governing pine oil, to Chemicals General
Allocation Order M-300, and thereby simplify in,-*
ventory controls. Revoked September 1945.
*1-340. Miscellaneous Chemicals. General Preference Order. .
To govern "tKe purchase"of miscellaneous chemicals
which are ultimately delivered to or incorporated in
materials for the military, certain other Government
agencies, or any "preferred purpose" listed in the
order.
Gum and Wood Rosins. (February 1945)»
iPia». far* (August 1945).
Revolted September 1945*
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K-343. Box-veneer* Conservation. Order. (August 1943). To
establiilT"production quotas for producers of boxveneer aad confine the sale of box-veneer produced to
meet such quota %o box manufacturers la order to meet
requirements of export shipments aad essential domes
tic uses. Revoked September 1945.

I4~35lt* Black Walnut Logs» Conservation Order* (December
i$43). To~°proHiSit the use of black walnut logs for
uses other than gunstocfcs and gunstoek flitches, and
provide for releas® of aaterial unsuitable for swell
uses. Revoked April 1944.
M-359* Port Orford Cedar. Conservation Order, (November
1943'}• To allocate all Port Orford cedar logs, or any
parts cut therefrom, and to direct or prohibit the use
or production of such Materials in order to meet
direct and indirect military requirements, chieflybattery separators* -Revoked July 1945«
M-361. Southern Yellow Pine. Conservation Order. {December
1943)"= To provide, through certification or special
authorisation, for strict allocation of southern yel
low pine lumber {except lath, shingles, and cross
ties) produced by the larger mills for the purpose of
conserving, supplies of such lumber for direct and in
direct war uses. Revoked August 1944® Superseded
by Order L-335*
15-364. Hardwood Limber. Conservation Order. {December
1943)* To provide, through certification or special
authorisation, for strict allocation of oak, ash,
hickory, yellow birch, hard maple, rock elm, beech,
and pecaa (added later) luaber (excepting shingles,
lathe, and .cross ties} produced by the larger mills
for the purpose of conserving supplies of siuch lumber
for direct and indirect war uses. Revoked August
1944* Superseded by Order L-335.
ii-3650 fine Oil* Allocation Order. {May 1944). To estab
lish authority to allocate pine oil and to restrict
its distribution and use to meet Military and essen
tial needs, chiefly for disinfectant purposes. Re
voked November 1944. Superseded by Order M-300,
Schedule 73*
}:-3$6« Motole Fir Aircraft Logs and Lumber. General Liasi&a-*
ties "Ord#rT {February l533*}~ §#"""reestablish the
authority to allocate aad direct, or prohibit,, the
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use of Moble fir aircraft logs and lumber to meet mil
itary needs* Moble fir originally controlled in
September 1942 by Order M-228 and revoked in May 19%4.
Revoked September 1945•
14-33?. Rosin. Conservation Order. {February 1945). To con
serve g«a and wood rosin by restricting distribution*
use, and inventories to meet military and essential
civilian needs. Revoked July 1946.
War Production Board and Civilian Production
AtlSlalitra^ioii Xln^tation drleri*"^1 "L* Serfei
(To curtail the production of particular products
to save materials generally.)
i-41. Construction. Conservation Order. (April 1942). To
prohibit'"construction not essential to the war effort
by requiring certification of new construction, and
thereby conserve materials, equipment, and labor need
ed to meet war requirements. Revoked October 1945«
L-121. Construction Lumber. Limitation Order. (May 1942.}
"For 105 days, to limit the sale and delivery of soft
wood construction lumber by producers (other than
small producers}, or authorised intervening persons,
to military agencies and their contractors and sub
contractors, excepting certain specified persons for
specified uses, in order to meet the military con
struction program. Revoked September 1945. Super
seded by Order M«2Gd.
1,-150. Douglas Fir Plywood. Limitation Order. (June 1942).
To restrict the' production and distribution of mois
ture-resistant type of Douglas-fir plywood to specified
types and sizes, with certain exceptions (primarily
military orders!; and later (June 19431 to require
prior approval of production and delivery schedules ia
an effort to channel all softwood plywood production
in Washington, Oregon and California to war and es
sential civilian uses. Revoked August 1945.
L-150-a Softwood Plywood. Limitation Order. (December 1942}®
To limit salesT™*shipments, and deliveries of softwood
through wholesale and retail channels to orders bear
ing ratings that were issued only to military and
essential civilian needs. Revoked August 1945®

£6
L-150-b. Plywoods Limitation Order. (December 1942). To
require" that the newly developed Hutment grade of
Douglas-fir plywood be produced ia accordance with
specifications in the Order and sold for the single
purpose of constructing temporary military housing.
This grade of plywood served as a substitute for
other exterior types of plywood. Revoked June 1943*
L-21S.

Douglas-Fir Lumber* Limitation Order. (October
1942). To "make 'the maximum amount of Douglas-fir
lumber (produced ia Washington and Oregon west of
the crest of the Cascade Mountain range) available
to the armed force® by restricting the sale, ship
ments, and deliveries by producers to only the Central
Procuring Agency of the Corps of Engineers and their
agents, or through the. War Production Board* Re
voked August 1944* Superseded by Order L-335.

L-227-b. Wood cased Pencils and Pen Holders. General Limita
tion Order.. (September"1943 )'• To control the pro
duction of wood eased pencils and pen holders
through establishment of maximum quotas and to re
strict the use of rubber and prohibit the use of
certain critical metals in their aianufacture. These
products were previously controlled by Order L-22?,
issued December 1942» Revoked May 1945•
L-232.

Wooden Containers for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables.
Limitation" Order. (March 1943)* To standardise and
simplify specifications for wooden containers for
shipping fruits and vegetables ia order to facilitate
the re-use of containers and thereby conserve lumber,
metals* and manpower. Revoked August 1945®

L-232*-a. Wooden Shipping Containers for Oranges and Grapefruit®
Supplemental Order* (November 1943). To liait the
shipment in wooden containers of oranges and grape
fruit originating in Texas, California, and Arizona
to a certain percentage of their total production in
order to conserve lumber. Revoked November 1944#
L-260»

Furniture. General Limitation Order. (February
1943). To prohibit new patterns of wood furniture,
to reduce the existing patterns by two-thirds, and
to limit the use of iron and steel in the manufac
ture of wood furniture* Included Venetian blinds.
Revoked April 1944.
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L-260-a*

Furniture. General Limitation Order. {December
1943•) TO restrict use of lumber for furniture and
crating of furniture, and to limit the use of cer
tain grades of seven particularly critical hard
woods needed for Amy track bodies and other impor
tant uses. Revoked August 1945*

1-263.

Matches. Limitation Order. (February 1943). To
restrict the size of matches and the use of materials
therein for the purpose of conserving lumber, chem
icals, wood pulp, and wire. Revoked August 1945«

L-2&3•

Brooms. General Conservation Order. {August 1943)•
fo "limit the amount of metals used in brooms, to
restrict the diameter of broom handles, the number
of coats of finish, and the number of sewing seams,
and to limit the number of designs in which various
types of brooms can be made. Revoked March 1944.

L-2S5.

Boxwood. Limitation Order. (April 1943). To limit
the use of dogwood logs, cants, flitches, and blocks
to the manufacture of shuttles. Revoked August 1945*

L-290.

Western Lumber. Limitation Order. (May 1943). To
restrict the sale, shipment, or delivery of the
following species produced by all except small mills
in the twelve western states; Ponderosa pine, Idaho
white pine, sugar pine, lodgepole pine, white fir,
Western white spruce, and Engelmann spruce to the
Central Procuring Agency of the Corps of Engineers,
or their Agents, or to persons specifically author
ised by the War Production Board. Revoked August
1944. Superseded by Order L-335»

L-335.

Lumber Consumers* Requirements Order. (March 1944)*
(In June 1944 and thereafter known as "Lumber Con
trol Order.") Originally, to require all major con
sumers of lumber to file applications giving their
requirements for second and third quarters of 1944The comprehensive revision of June 1944 set up pro
cedures for all but the smallest sawmills (produc
ing 100,000 board feet of lumber or less annually)
to deliver lumber; for distributors receiving and
delivering lumber, and for all consumers receiving
lumber; and to control, through quarterly authoriza
tion, the amount of lumber that large industrial
consumers may receive. Revoked September 1945•
Directions 1-5 to L-335. (July 1944). Provide
that sawmills over certain sizes wist give military
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orders precedence up to specified percentages of
their anticipated monthly shipments of certain
species* The species covered by the five directions
ares
Direction 1: Douglas-fir, white, fir, noble fir,
^£tka spruce {except aircraft grade) and hemlock
produced, in Oregon and Washington west of the crest
of the Cascade Mountain range. Revoked August. 1945•
Direction 2% Ponderosa pine, sugar pine, lodgepole
pin®, Idaho whit© pine, white fir, Douglas-fir,
Western white spruce, Eagelaann spruce, and larch
produced in the area generally known commercially
as the Western pis© area.
Direction 3: Redwood produced in California* Re
voked August 1945•
Direction 4: Southern yellow pine produced in
eleven southern states, Revoked August 1945.
Direction
Red or Yellow cypress, chiefly pro
duced in South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, and
Louisiana. Revoked August 1945«
Direction 1A to 1,-335. {April 1945)• To provide
that sawmills covered by Direction 1 must manufac
ture at least forty percent of their montly produc
tion of Douglas-firj white fir, and West Coast hem
lock in one-inch boards and at least twenty-five
percent in two-inch dimension* Eevoked August 1945*
Direction 2A to L-335. {December 1944). To limit
the receipt oT~Western pine lumber to designated
claimants and consumers having specific authoriza
tion from the War Production Board, Revoked August
1945.
Direction 6* {August 1944). To provide for the
sale of MoT 4 or lower grades of Douglas-fir, south
ern yellow pine, western hemlock, western red cedar,
Sitka spruce, and No. 3 or lower grades of all
species of hardwood on uncertified orders. Revoked
August 1945.
Direction £. (July 1944). To permit sawmills not
covered by Directions 1 to 5 to accept and make de
livery on uncertified and unrated orders of lumber.
Revoked August 1945*
Direction I# |«luly 1944)* To establish the pro
cedure by which lumber distributors obtained a lim
ited amount of lunber intended for sale on uncerti
fied and unrated orders, thereby providing for the
needs of the small private consumer and the small
industrial consumer without ratings. Revoked Aug
ust 1945®

S9
(1-335 cont*d.|
Direction $A to L-335. (September 1944)* To permit
lumber distributors, for a four-months period, to
deliver to small private consumers aad small indus
trial consumers accumulated stocks of slow aoviag
items which were not adaptable to war uses, aad to
permit sawmills aad distributors ia certain areas
to dispose of their excess stocks of Douglas-fir,
larch, and red cedar to farosrs ia those areas. Re
voked January 1945.
Direction £« ' (July 1944). To prohibit the us® of
certain grades of white oak, Idaho white pine, spruce,
ponderosa pine, sugar pine, white fir, and red cypress
in the manufacture of 26 types of products; to pro
hibit the use of any species except birch, beech,
maple, pecan, aad oak in the manufacture of hardwood
flooring; aad to prohibit the use of certain species
aad .grades for dunnage. Revoked August 1945.
Direction 10. (July 1944)• To define aad clarify
what is meant fey "receipts of lumber" during third
quarter, 1944- Revoked January 1945.
Direction. 11. .(^^Ly 19441. To provide that any
""sSaHT*may deliver ash lumber to any ash specialist
without restriction. Revoked August 1945.
Direction H.. (August 1944). To allow large con
sumers'"bf' lumber to receive a part of their fourthquarter allotments of hardwood during the third
quarter. Revoked January 1945•
Direction 15. (September 1944). To allow delivery
of "veneer 'flitches to manufacturers without regard
to the provisions of L-335, and to clarify the re
porting requirements of veneer manufacturers. Re
voked January 1945•
Direction 16. (September 1944). To permit farmers
to receive without certification up to 5,000 board
feet of lumber annually if produced from trees cut
from their own farms. Revoked January 1945*
Direction 17* (April 1945). To require wholesale
lumber dealers and commission men handling southern
yellow, pine lumber to report to the War Production
Board their monthly volume of sales of such lumber
to show how much was going to various uses. Revoked
August 1945.
Direction 18. (Kay 1945). To permit distribution
yards'with mamon ownership to pool certified orders*
Revoked August 1945.
M44*

Picker Stick. Blaakn. Liaitatioa Order. (April 1945K
T© prohibit the use of hickory picker stick blanks
for any purpose except the manufacture of picker
sticks. Revoked August 1945o

90
L~35Go

Softwood Veneer, Limitation Order, (August 1945).
fo 'channel 'softwood veneer produced in Washington,
Oregon, and California to softwood plywood manufac
turers aad to box manufacturers and to limit the
use of such veneer solely to the manufacture of
plywood and shipping containers. Revoked August
1945.

L-358.

Softwood Plywood* Limitation Order. (October 19461*
To provide that manufacturers of softwood plywood
must produce and reserve a percentage of their pro
duction in construction and door panel grades? to
require that a part of the reserve be delivered to
distributors on unrated and uncertified orders, and
the balance on orders covering highly essential
projects (M M ratings) and on certified orders from
distributors and manufacturers of certain housing
product© and certain other essential items. Revoked
March 1947.

L-359.

Lumber, lardwood Flooring and Hi11work. Limitation
Order, {October 1946}'. fo provide that sawmills
shall produce a percentage of their total production
of lumber in housing construction lumber and hard
wood flooring lumber which is to be held for certi
fied and rated orders from distributors and manu
facturers of certain housing projects, and other
items. Revoked March 1947»

Civilian Production Administration - Veterans'
Emergency Housing Program Orders - VHP & PR Series
{To divert critical materials from cieTerable or
less essential construction to veterans* housing.}
PR-33.

Veterans1 Emergency Housing Program. (December 1945)•
To assist private builders, educational institutions
and others to build moderate-cost housing accommoda
tions for which veterans of World War II would be
given preference by assigning an HH preference rat
ing for certain materials (including lumber, hard
wood flooring, raillwork, and softwood plywood) needed
for construction. Specific directions to PR-33 ap
plying to forest products (and the purpose of the
direction) are as follows;
Direction 1 to PR-33. Lumber. Hardwood Flooring.
and MiXIworfc. {January 1946). To require saw
mills (cutting annually over two million board
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feet of softwood or one million board feet of
hardwood) to produce a percentage of their total
production in housing construction lumber and
hardwood flooring for certified orders (with an
HI rating) froa distributors, prefabricators,
hardwood flooring manufacturers, and housing con
tractors. Revoked November 1946®
Direction 1A to PR-33» Softwood Plywood» (March
XP^)« To require manufacturers of softwood ply*
wood to produce a percentage of their total pro
duction in construction and door panel grades
and reserve a percentage of those grades for
certified orders (with an HH rating) froa prefabricators, distributors? stock cabinet manufactur
ers. and housing contractors. Revoked October
194"»
Direction $ to PR-33. Prefabricated Housing,
'('March' 194^}. To explain how "manufacturers of
prefabricated houses, sections or panels, may get
Hi ratings for certain materials, including lus
her fflillwork, hardwood flooring, and softwood
plywood. This direction was transferred to OHE
in March 194? and revoked in April 1943.
YHP-2.

General Restrictions on Hardwood Lumber. (July
1946}." To prohibit builders"from'using beech, birch,
hard maple, oak, or pecan boards or dimension lumber
for framing, wall or roof sheathing, boxing, siding,
or subflooring in any house, building, or other
structure in order to conserve the short supply of
such species. Revoked February 1947.

VHP-5.

Douglas-fir and Western Pine Shop Lumber. (April
1947).~ fo' restrict the 'delivery o£ "a large portion
of certain sizes and grades of Bouglas-fir and
western pine shop lumber to millwork or cut-stock
manufacturers. Revoked June 1947.

Office of Housing Expediter Veterans1 Emergency
Housing Program Orders - SPPR Series
(To stimulate production of *building materials by pro
viding premium payments for materials produced above
established quotas.)

£JPPE»2»

Softwood Plywood. (June 1946}* To stimulate addi
tional production of softwood plywood by providing
for premium payments m peeler logs consumed in ad
ditional production of softwood plywood above
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established quotas and t® establish such quotas,
and the methods, procedures, and conditions under
which premium payments may be obtained. Revoked
April 1943.
JSPPE-4®

Standing Timber on State Owned Lands, (July 1946J *
To stimulat© additional production of lumber and
other forest products fro® standing timber on State
owned lands by providing for premium payments to
states to enable tit#® to utilia© additional facili-'
ties for asking such ti®b«r ready for sale. Revoked
April 194i.

EPPR-6.

Hardwood Flooring - Southern Area. {August 1946).
To stimulated additionalproduction of hardwood
flooring in the southern area by providing for prem
ium payments on production of such flooring above
established quotas* Revoked April 194#•

EPPR-7.

Hardwood Flooring - northern Area. {August 1946),
fo""stlfflulat® additional production of hardwood floor
ing in the northern area by providing for premium
payments on production of such flooring above estab
lished quotas* Revoked April 1943.
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OFFICE OP PRICE ADMINISTRATION MAXIMUM PRICE ISOtTLATIOWS
(To establish price ceilings on individual products in an
effort to curb inflation*}
Primary Forest Products-*MPR
MPR
MPS
,MPR
MPR
MPR.
MPR
TUP!2
KPR3
GMPR
1PR
MPR
MPR
'PMPR

54 B©uglas-fir peeler logs
(Revoked June 1942. Superseded
by MPR 161.)
161 West Coast logs
216 Eastern railroad ties
25? Pulpwood produced in Lake States
284 Viestera primary forest products
(Revoked September 1944* Super
seded by MFls 554, 555, and 556,
313 Veneer legs
324 Eastern fenc© posts
30 Pulpwood cut ia Southeastern
States
346 Eastern lags and bolts
Order lo. 16. Picker stick
blanks produced ia North and
South Carolina
361 Pulpwood produced in Mew York and.
northern Hew England States
3#7 Pulpwood produced in South Caro
lina, Georgia, and Florida
36$ Pulpwood cut in certain South
eastern States
32 Pulpwood cut in designated
Eastern States

APrior

Effective Date
December 1941
December 1941
September 1942
November 1942

February 1943
February 1943
March 1943
April 1943
April 1943
April 1943

«ay 1943
May 1943
June 1943

to the establishment of specific maximum prices,
most of the primary timber products (poles, posts, piling,
split stock, mine timbers, and similar semi-finished timber
products) became subject t© the General U&xiwam Price Regula
tion in June 1942. Cordwood sold for firewood was subject to
GMPR, but cordwood sold for processing into lumber or pulp
was not. Logs sold for processing into lumber, veneer, etc.,
also was not subject to GMPR, For each individual seller,
the maximum prices for any of the products subject to GMPR
could be no higher than the highest price he charged for
delivery of the product in March 1942#

ms^ismm prie« regulation*
^Geaersl maximum prim regulation*
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C Primary Forest Products cont'd)
Effective Date
tfHT
4115 Pulpwood produced in designated
States west of the Mississippi
River
June 1943
KPR
433 Pulpwood produced in Morth Caro
lina and certain portions of
Virginia
July 1943
Iff®
437 Pulpwood produced in ©astern
Virginia
July 1943
MPS
460 Western timber
August 1943
KPR
464 Pulpwood cut in designated Eastern
States
August 1943
Iff®
491 Pressure preservative treatment of
forest products and pressure
treated forest products
November 1943
MPR
503 Western contract logging services January 1944
KPR
530 Import prices for pulpwood pro
duced in the Canadian Provinces
of Quebec, New Brunswick, and
Nova Scotia
May 1944
KPR 533-1 Central logs
May 1944
MPR 533-2 Lake States log®
May 1944
i-fPR 533^3 Appalachian logs
May 1944
IIPR 533-4 Southern logs
May 1944
MM 533-5 Northeastern logs
May 1944
MPR 533-6 Florida logs
May 1944
MPR 534-1 Black walnut logs
May 1944
MPR 534-2 Hickory and ash logs and other
specialty woods
May 1944
KPR 535-1 Insulation and felt cordwood and
related products
May 1944
MPR 535-2 Lake States cordwood
May 1944
MPS 535-3 Excelsior wood
May 1944
MPR 535-4 New England cordwood
Hay 1944
MPS 535-5 Chestnut cordwood
May 1944
MPS 535-6 Stave and heading bolts
May 1944
MPR 535-7 Chemical cordwood
May 1944
MPR 536
Western fence posts
May 1944
MPR 554
Western red cedar poles and piling September 1944
September 1944
MPR 555
Western poles and piling
KPR 556
Western railroad ties and wood
September 1944
mine materials
MPR 55s
Eastern wood rain® materials and
September 1944
industrial blocking
September 1944
KP! 559
Eastern poles and piling
IIPR 560
Northern white cedar poles and
September 1944
piling
MPR 565
Pulpwood contract logging ser
vices in designated Eastern
States
ioveaber 1944
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MPE
MPE
MPH
MPE
MPE
MPE
MPS
MPR
MPS

219
222
293
3di
412
454
433

MPE

513

MPl
MPE

525
539A

MPl

539B

MPS

539C

MPH
MPR.
OSA

6od

19
19A

601

MPE

13

MPR

26

MPR
MPE

44
109

MPE
MPE
MPE
MPE

I64
253
290
402

Eastern Softwood Lumber and Millwork
"Effective d
Southern pine lumber
September
Log-ran southern pin© lumber
April 1944
Northeastern softwood lumber
September 1942
September 1942
Northern softwood lumber
Stock millwork
January 1943
Stock screen goods
May 1943
June 1943
Tidewater red cypress lumber
August 1943
Aromatic red cedar lumber
"General Manager Type" grain
doors and temporary coal doors
October 1943
for box cars
Yellow cypress lumber
(Revoked August 1945- Superseded
February 1944
by MPR 971.
Jobber sales of stock millwork
April 1944
Gusto® Killing and kiln drying of
softwood and hardwoods in the
Northeastern area
September 1944
Custom milling and kiln drying of
softwoods and hardwoods in the
Southern area
March 1945
Custom milling and kiln drying of
softwoods and hardwoods in Mid
west and Great Lake States
March 1945
Softwood mouldings
November 1945
Special millwork
May 1946
Directive 94 Southern pine
lumber
January 1946
Western Softwood Lumber and Millwork
Douglas-fir and other softwood ply^
wood
August 1941
Douglas-fir and other West Coast
lumber
October 1941
December 1941
Douglas-fir doors
April 1942
Aircraft lumber
{Revoked October 1945. Super
seded by MPE 290.}
Western softwood shingles
June 1942
November 1942
Redwood limber and millwork
January
1943
Sitka spruce lumber
June 1943
Western red cedar lumber

^Office of Stabilization Administrator
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MPl
IfPE

Western Softwood Lumber and Millwork {cont'd}
Effective date
539
Custom milling and kila drying of
Western softwoods
June 1942
589
Douglas-fir stock millwork
June 1945
Hardwood Lumber and Miscellaneous Wood Products

RPR
mm
MPR
MPR
KPE

97

146
155
196

21?

KPE

218

MPH
MPR
MPR
«PR

223
2ai
338

MPl
MPl

432
45S

IfPE
!#R
MPR
MPR
MPR

501
538
568
603
611

Southern hardwood lumber
February 1942
Appalachian hardwood lumber
May 1942
Central hardwood lumber
June 1942
Turned or shaped wood products
August 1942
Walnut lumber and walnut gunstock blanks
Septeaber 1942
Eastern wooden mine Material and
industrial blocking
September 1942
{Revoked November 1943* Super
seded by MPl 216 and each of the
hardwood lumber reflations.)
Northern hardwood luaber
September 1942
Mavy oak ship stock
December 1942
Aircraft veneer
March 1943
Supplementary Regulation No. 14.
Grain doors sold to railroads
March 1943
Northern hardwood flooring
July 1943
Oak, pecan and miscellaneous
hardwood flooring
August 1943
Hardwood small dimension
December 1943
Commercial veneer
June 1944
Hardwood plywood
December 1944
Suprlus lumber
Moveaber 1945
Mahogany lumber
June 1946
Distribution

MPR

215

MPl

46?

Distribution yard sales of soft
wood lumber
Distribution yard sales of hard
wood luaber

September 1942
Septeaber 1943

Ifod Containers
MPS

11?

!<LPE

160

Used egg cases and used component
parts
April 1942
Seasoned woodea agricultural
containers
June 1942
(Revoked February 1943* Superseiei by MPR 320*)
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Wood Containers (contfd)

KPR
MPR

176
li6

HPS
1-SPR

195
320

I4PR
MPR

342
424

MPR

434

MPR

4$1

MPR
MPR
MPR
MPR

4&5
520
524
593

Box grade veneer
Western wooden agricultural
containers
Industrial wooden boxes
Eastern and central wooden agri
cultural containers
Mail .kegs, staves and heading
Tight cooperage stock and sawed
tight cooperage
Used fruit and vegetable con
tainers
Slack cooperage and cooperage
stock
Wirebound boxes
West Coast cooperage
Used tight cooperage
Used slack cooperage

Effective date
July 1942
July 1942
August 1942
February 1943
February 1943
April 1943
July 1943
April 1943
June 1943
March 1944
April 1944
August 1945

laval Stores
GMPR
MPR
MPR
MPR
TMPR
MPR

Am. 5 Wood and gun naval stores
179
Pine Oil
297
Natural resins
44©
Pine tar and pin® tar oil
36
Qua rosin
561
Gum rosin

June 1942
July 1942
January 1943
August 1943
June 1944
September 1944

Other Forest Products

MPR
MPR
MPR
MPR

312
352
431
531

MPR

551

Maple sugar aad syrup
Chestnut extract
Charcoal
Imported vegetable tanning
materials
Certain sales of hemlock and
chestnut oak barks

February 1943
April 1943
July 1943
May 1944

August 1944

All maximum price regulations not previously revoked
were revoked oa November 10, 1946»

